**Burundi (1972)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Hutu militias, Martyazo / Burundi, Tutsi militias

**Policing/Juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 Most mentions of Burundi in 1972 do not call the conflict a civil war. Most describe it as one of various forms of one-sided violence—massacre, genocide, or the like.[[1]](#footnote-1) It began as a brief Hutu independence movement. In response to the violence committed by this movement, the incumbent government responded with a campaign of anti-Hutu reprisals committed by Tutsi soldiers. After other African governments intervened (most notably Zaire, although Tanzania also sent materiel), the violence died down.[[2]](#footnote-2)

 The violence seems to stem from old colonial wounds. The territory was initially colonized by Germany in the 19th Century but was conquered by Belgium in WWI. Until the country won its independence in 1962, Burundi’s Belgian colonial masters ruled through Tutsi proxies.[[3]](#footnote-3) The governmental hierarchy between Hutu and Tutsi survived into post-independence Burundi, despite the overwhelming numerical majority (roughly 80%) enjoyed by Hutus.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 The Hutu independence movement culminated in the declaration of the new independent state of Martyazo. The country was short-lived and perilously short of administrative capability.[[5]](#footnote-5) They quickly set up road blocks to mark out their territory and set about killing enemies (real or perceived) of the would-be state. Although they had indeed established something like rule in this territory, one should not mistake it for much more than control, even when one considers the tribunals the rebels had set up. Aiden Russell points out the similarity between the unfettered violence brought to bear by rebels and government to underscore the damage it did to Burundian society and to suggest that the violence contributed to further violence in the later civil wars.[[6]](#footnote-6)

**Cambodia** **(1970-1975)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Khmer Rouge, Khmer National United Front (FUNK) / Khmer Republic

**Policing/Juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 After a coup d’état dissolved the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Khmer Republic was established with then-Prime Minister Lon Nol given extraordinary powers in the new state.[[7]](#footnote-7) A civil war began in earnest, with supporters of the ousted monarchy and communist guerilla forces maintaining consistent support in the countryside. Their alliance was a strange one, as only months before the coup, Prince Sihanouk had been fighting against Khmer Rouge forces.[[8]](#footnote-8) The support from Vietnamese communists made this odd couple a trio, but no less odd; although initially supportive of the movement, the Vietnamese saw their offers of paternal support of Khmer Rouge rebuffed in the 1950s. Indeed, given the Hanoi-Sihanouk dialogue during the 1960s and the purge of pro-Vietnamese communists from Khmer Rouge, one could argue that the Vietnamese communists were closer with the monarchists.[[9]](#footnote-9)

 Despite the antipathy between Vietnamese and Cambodian communists, the former did take great pains to establish a parallel system of governance for the rebels. They sought out and identified individuals and arranged for them to be elected by a public show of hands. Once elected, they would serve as FUNK chairmen for their village.[[10]](#footnote-10) Had Khmer Rouge been directly responsible for these elections, this would be a momentous success of Khmer Rouge’s efforts to establish a rebel governance apparatus. After all, they were Cambodia’s first free elections held at such a level. However, it was substantially dependent upon the Viet Cong. For instance, the Vietnamese not only played a role in selecting who would, but if the winner proved unsuitable politically, they were dismissed after a short time.[[11]](#footnote-11) Moreover, its authority was regularly undermined by VC forces stationed around the villages. One account notes an attempt by a FUNK chairman to adjudicate a dispute between monks and VC forces that led to the chairmen receiving a public beating.[[12]](#footnote-12) This disrespect underscored the fact that this system of local governance was little more than an instrument of Vietnamese control. It also highlights the fact that that as an administrative apparatus, it was “in its infancy.”[[13]](#footnote-13)

 Once the Cambodian communists broke away from Vietnam, they abolished FUNK—the auspices under which the tenuous triple alliance existed—and took control of the village leadership structures the Vietnamese had established.[[14]](#footnote-14) After this seizure, the popular selection of village leadership ceased, and district level officials selected chairmen for each village, further consolidating the group’s power around a small number of people. However, the village-level administration continued to function as a policing instrument.[[15]](#footnote-15) Given the communists’ taste for punitive measures in response to criticism of their revolution, this function was used frequently.

 The provision of public goods was largely absent from this structure. This presaged the Khmer Rouge’s hostility to education and educators during the short-lived Democratic Kampuchea. Interestingly, Sihankouk had invested substantial resources into building up Cambodia’s educational resources prior to his ouster. These came under attack during the course of the conflict.[[16]](#footnote-16) While the comprehensive plan of destroying and remaking Cambodia’s education would not take shape until 1975, KR antipathy to education as an oppressive and reactionary instrument of colonialism manifested itself as early as 1971.[[17]](#footnote-17) Little is known about health provision, although the efforts to restore education provision as the regime was collapsing were often conducted alongside similar efforts to restore healthcare provision.[[18]](#footnote-18)

**Chad (1965-1979)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT), Armed Forces of the North (FAN) / Chad

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 Shortly after gaining independence, Muslim rebels from northern Chad began a civil war to oust southern president François Tombalbaye. The conflict appears to have been driven by ethnic tensions exacerbated by inept administration and Tombalbaye’s autocracy, but the FROLINAT rebels were themselves hardly free from such tensions. After Tombalbaye was removed by one of his generals, Felix Malloum, FROLINAT split into two, with FAN constituting the new group.[[19]](#footnote-19)

FROLINAT rebels controlled the northern third of Chad, consisting of the prefectures of Bourkoum, Ennedei and Tibesti (BET), from around 1971.[[20]](#footnote-20) This was achieved with Libyan assistance, as Muhammar Qadhafi hoped the rebels would allow Libya to annex the mineral-rich Aozou. Strip.[[21]](#footnote-21) Despite carving out an impressive stretch of territory for itself, there are few mentions of rebel administration. FROLINAT administration appears to have consisted primarily of a system of communications and identification cards.[[22]](#footnote-22) This may be somewhat surprising given FROLINAT’s founder Ibrahim Abatcha’s political ideology, but the group began to splinter after he was killed in combat and was riven by internal divisions beforehand.[[23]](#footnote-23) Moreover, BET could hardly be said to have been administered at all, even during Chad’s colonial period; the lack of robust administration was not exactly a new development.[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Cyprus (1974)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT), Turkey / Cyprus, EOKA-B, Greece

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 Following a coup d’état to remove President Makarios III and install Nikos Sampson, Turkey invaded the northern portion of Cyprus, ultimately establishing de facto control of a substantial portion of the island.[[25]](#footnote-25) Even more so than the Yemen civil war from 1962-1970, this was a war of proxies. Although some Cypriot organizations were involved, the conflict was primarily fought between EOKA-B, Greece, and Turkey.[[26]](#footnote-26)

 Ultimately, the occupied portion of the island declared itself to be an independent state.[[27]](#footnote-27) However, there was precious little governing going on during the conflict. Cypyus’s own administration was being supplemented by foreign intervention, particularly (although not exclusively) by Britain.[[28]](#footnote-28) Given these facts, it is unsurprising that TMT rebels, themselves conducted by Ankara’s government, did little (if any) governing themselves.[[29]](#footnote-29)

**Democratic Republic of the Congo (1977-1978)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Front for the National Liberation of Congo (FLNC) / Zaire

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 The brief conflict (or conflicts) in what is now the Democratic Republic of Congo began in Angola with the formation of the FLNC by Nathaniel Mbumba, a former police commissioner in Shaba just prior to the conflict.[[30]](#footnote-30) Zaire emerged victorious, but only after being bested in the field by the rebels. Thanks to foreign intervention, Mobutu’s Zaire was preserved.[[31]](#footnote-31)

 It appears as though there was hardly an opportunity to govern, much less a political ideology or program from which to model such governance. In addition to the conflict’s brevity, the group held a small amount of territory for a vanishingly small period of time.[[32]](#footnote-32) It also appears that the group had little ideology to speak of. There is a mention of being broadly aligned with Laurent Kabila, but even this source does not deny that the group had no political ideology or program.[[33]](#footnote-33) Others argue that, due to its genesis in Angola, that the group’s adoption of Marzist rhetoric in 1978 signaled a leftist agenda, but contemporary experts agreed that this was a group held together by tribal solidarity and esprit de corps, not ideological solidarity.[[34]](#footnote-34) Regardless, it was generally believed that the FLNC did not represent local interests.[[35]](#footnote-35)

**Iran (1978-1979)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Wide variety of opposition groups, ultimately allying with Ruhollah Khomeini / Imperial Iran

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 The Iranian Revolution brought a multitude of groups together in opposition of the incumbent Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Many of the groups held mutually exclusive ideologies.[[36]](#footnote-36) The incumbent regime’s dictatorial, militarized, personalistic, corrupt, and unpopular.[[37]](#footnote-37) Its visible connection to foreign powers only made these flaws more damning, allowing the revolutionary movement to sublimate contradictions among the various opposition groups toward the united hatred of the shah.

The “war” is best remembered as a protest movement, although there was ample violence, both by police and SAVAK secret police agents[[38]](#footnote-38) and by anti-shah rebels.[[39]](#footnote-39) Many were concerned that the real civil war would begin once the contradictions among the various opposition groups were allowed to come to the fore,[[40]](#footnote-40) forcing a reckoning regarding what sort of state post-revolution Iran would be.[[41]](#footnote-41) While this reckoning did indeed come about,[[42]](#footnote-42) the revolution itself did not display many attributes associated with rebel governance.

 This should not be terribly surprising. Iran faced a serious economic crisis which, given its unpopularity and weakness, meant that militarized conflict was unnecessary to force the regime to collapse.[[43]](#footnote-43) As such, Imperial Iran was not so much conquered as the Shah was defenestrated. Iran as a state, with its robust oil revenues, survived the revolution.

**Iraq (1961-1970)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) / Iraq

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 Upon overthrowing the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, General Abd al-Karim Qasim immediately emphasized Kurdish equality with Arabs, both officially and unofficially. This honeymoon would not last long, even as the KDP (sometimes referred to as the DPK) established itself in Iraq. In 1960, the party was declared illegal and the war began in earnest the following year. Despite a relative lack of materiel, Kurdish forces were able to best Iraqis in their engagements, leading Qasim to employ overwhelming force (especially by way of the air force) upon his former partners.[[44]](#footnote-44)

 It appears as though Qasim’s use of indiscriminate force strengthened the Kurds’ resolve. This appears to have been a significant development, as the Kurds had substantial internal divides among them.[[45]](#footnote-45) The Iraqi government even recruited auxiliaries called “Saladin’s Cavaliers” to aid their efforts to overcome the KDP and the tribes it counted as allies.[[46]](#footnote-46) Having bested Iraqi forces in the field, the KDP signed an autonomy agreement with post-Qasim Ba’athist Iraq in 1970.[[47]](#footnote-47)

 On the surface, the KDP effort to harness popular support seems impressive. A legislature was established in 1964 and the influx in recruits after the Ba’athists took over in Baghdad clearly had a role in developing administration at the local level.[[48]](#footnote-48) However, looks may be somewhat deceiving. For one, the councils at the village and district level were primarily noteworthy for having “brought some degree of law and order into what had deteriorated into a chaotic situation in Kurdish territory.”[[49]](#footnote-49) While these wartime developments might have served as a runway leading to contesting elections—which, given Prime Minister Bazzaz’s proposal in 1964, was very much on the table[[50]](#footnote-50)—Mulla Mustafa’s presence loomed large over them[[51]](#footnote-51) and selection of leadership appears to primarily have been by appointment. With that said, Mulla Mustafa had established three assemblies: a senate, a consultative assembly, and a Revolutionary Council (which he presided over) to serve as an executive.[[52]](#footnote-52)

 The other elements of rebel governance were more fully realized. In addition to village and district councils, courts were established, though some reportedly chafed at this centralized form of criminal justice.[[53]](#footnote-53) Moreover, in addition to the new legislature, Kurdish territory was divided into five administrative districts, each with its own judicial administration.[[54]](#footnote-54) Although there are few mentions of policing, the fact that the 1970 agreement to end the war not only guaranteed autonomy but allowed 6,000 peshmerga troops to continue to operate as a “frontier militia force” suggests that Kurdish territory was administered with relatively little competition from Iraqi authority.[[55]](#footnote-55)

 Public good provision appears to have been less well-organized. Doctors who joined the pro-independence cause were able to cobble together “an elementary health service” alongside some hospitals, but there are few other mentions of similar developments.[[56]](#footnote-56) While there were a number of calls for the Kurdish language to be used in Kurdistan’s schools and universities,[[57]](#footnote-57) there is little evidence that the KDP had set up parallel schools to those which already existed.

**Iraq (1974-1975)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) / Iraq

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 Iraqi respect for Kurdish autonomy did not last long. Amidst stalling negotiations over the particulars of Kurdish autonomy, Iraqi forces defeated the Kurdish force. Despite adequate training and personnel, the Kurds lacked heavy weapons and so were hamstrung in achieving their objectives. Moreover, Iraqi forces performed far better in the second iteration of the conflict than the first.[[58]](#footnote-58) Thus, once Iran withdrew their support for the Peshmerga forces, Iraqi forces secured their victory in short order.[[59]](#footnote-59)

 Interestingly, Saddam Hussein offered the Kurds a deal just before the war which was quite similar to what former Prime Minister Bazzaz had done a decade earlier. It promised political representation, ostensible autonomy in all realms unrelated to foreign policy and defense, and even set aside a budget for developing new political parties. This offer—alongside the KDP’s continued administration of their controlled territory—suggests very little had changed on that front in the interbellum years.[[60]](#footnote-60) Further supporting this notion is the fact that the autonomy agreement was seen as granting additional powers to the government in Baghdad.[[61]](#footnote-61)

**Jordan (1970-1971)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Fedayeen (Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)) / Jordan

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 Following the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, many among the Palestinian liberation movement relocated to Jordan.[[62]](#footnote-62) Following an attempt on King Hussein’s life and three airliner hijackings, martial law was declared and the Jordanian military assaulted fedayeen positions. The Fedayeen were eventually defeated, but this may have been due to the disappointing showing of their international patrons. Iraqi forces and materiel never arrived, and although Syria invaded in support of the fedayeen, they did not deploy their air force (likely due to international pressure). The Syrian forces were repulsed with little fanfare, leaving the fedayeen to fend for themselves. Outmanned and outgunned, they were ultimately defeated some months later.[[63]](#footnote-63)

 Before the war began, the fedayeen had established control of several towns[[64]](#footnote-64) and even of parts of the capital, Amman.[[65]](#footnote-65) By the time the war began, the PLO had an active and functional police arm called the Palestine Armed Struggle Command. These ostensible military police exercised arrest powers, intervened in disputes over rents, and had offenders prosecuted in PLO-run courts.[[66]](#footnote-66) While these achievements were notable,[[67]](#footnote-67) its undermining of Jordanian authority might be even more so. PASC personnel regularly disregarded Jordanian law, even in the capital.[[68]](#footnote-68)

 The Palestinian “state-within-a-state” extended to the provision of public goods as well.[[69]](#footnote-69) The fedayeen mini-state provided medicine to its charges, boasting a network of clinics and even a few hospitals.[[70]](#footnote-70) There were also several schools, although their provision of medicine was more effective, particularly when compared to the cadre schools. [[71]](#footnote-71) These schools did serve to help supplement the group’s military leadership, an important element in an ostensibly popular movement. Regardless, they did little to solve the PLO’s lack of homegrown leadership; many of the military arm’s officers were Jordanian defectors.[[72]](#footnote-72)

**Laos (1959-1973)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Pathet Lao (PL) / Kingdom of Laos

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 The Laotian Civil War began when Leftist Laotian guerillas resumed activities in 1959. This could have been seen as a surprise, given the deft compromises the parties struck earlier in the decade. However, as anti-communist political forces consolidated electoral gains and marginalized left-wing figures, the growing American influence appeared to put earlier agreements at risk. They came to a boiling point when efforts were made to incorporate PL guerillas into the Laotian military.[[73]](#footnote-73) With substantial aid from North Vietnam, the war began in earnest.

 This aid’s impact cannot be overstated. Pathet Lao relied heavily upon their Vietnamese patrons, just as the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) was on their American patrons.[[74]](#footnote-74) Where PL was concerned, this was true both in terms of fighting forces and in terms of establishing parallel governance structures. However, the relationship between PL and Hanoi was much more amicable than Hanoi’s relationship with the Khmer Rouge. The fruits of this cooperation was an extensive administrative apparatus operable even before the war began in 1959.[[75]](#footnote-75)

 Similar to Vietnamese organizational model, Laotian communists sought to imbue extant relationships such as familial ties with revolutionary significance, rather than replace them with ties to party.[[76]](#footnote-76) This is not to say that PL did not seek to control their charges, though.[[77]](#footnote-77) Both policing and juridical functions were applied to great effect for this purpose.[[78]](#footnote-78) Alongside an extensive propaganda campaign, non-revolutionary behaviors were identified, prosecuted, and punished, albeit euphemistically as “periods of study.” Alternatively, an individual may be ostracized from their village or, if the offense is deemed serious enough, they may be tried by a secret tribunal:[[79]](#footnote-79) “if the offender did not return to his home, the other villagers deduced the verdict.”[[80]](#footnote-80) Thus, the “liberated zones” were tightly controlled by the Laotian rebels.

 Despite this emphasis on control, the party did extensively recruit members from the villages. Most opportunities were in mass organizations (in which membership was voluntary in name only),[[81]](#footnote-81) the party also recruited leadership from locally recruited cadres.[[82]](#footnote-82) This contrasts with the RLG, as its recruitment of officials allows advancement within the village level, but no further. While there was no opportunity to contribute to new policy as only the most enthusiastically loyal were considered for these positions, this is worth noting.

 Their provision of education is well-documented. Laos’s prewar education system was essentially inaccessible to most Laotians.[[83]](#footnote-83) Education in the liberated zones was heavy on indoctrination,[[84]](#footnote-84) but it represented a substantial improvement over previous educational provision and was a source of propaganda for the party.[[85]](#footnote-85) This was put to strategic use, as the promise of literacy was used to entice villagers to take up arms in the war.[[86]](#footnote-86)

 Little is known about PL’s efforts at providing healthcare aside from instructions given to cadres that they “give medical care to tribal peoples.”[[87]](#footnote-87) For instance, there are few mentions of tangible healthcare infrastructure. However, Buddhist monks, in addition to being encouraged (or forced) to undergo “re-education” were urged to help care fore the sick and injured in their vicinity. The extent and timing of this development are difficult to pin down though, as it was only codified as policy in 1976.[[88]](#footnote-88)

**Laos (1975)**

Rebels / Incumbents: PL / Kingdom of Laos

**Policing/Juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

Following a cease-fire in 1973 and the formation of a coalition government in 1974, Pathet Lao’s patrons in Hanoi pushed the rebels to topple the government in 1975. This is a bit odd, given the privileged position the Pathet Lao enjoyed in this coalition. The National Political Consultative Council, formed at the coalition’s genesis, allowed the Pathet Lao to circumvent legislative checks on its power, and its 18-point plan was gaining broad acceptance within the population. Communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia caused Hanoi to push for action and so PL abandoned the plan for a slow transition.[[89]](#footnote-89)

 By 1975, PL were exercising power with little regard for their coalition partners. Having gained control of many of Laos’s levers of power as well as popular support for their apparently moderate 18-point plan, rightist elements were quickly defeated or marginalized.[[90]](#footnote-90) Prince Souphanouvon, a noted leader of the PL (but, interestingly, a member of the otherwise “re-educated” royal family) was installed as Laos’s president and the Kingdom of Laos was replaced by the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.

 Although technically a war, the seizure of power was relatively peaceful when compared to other revolutions. Indeed, a number of Laotians voluntarily attended “re-education” seminars in PL controlled territory, thinking this the only way to stay in the country under the emergent regime. The rapidity with which the revolution took place meant that few new apparatuses could be constructed in the interim, though.[[91]](#footnote-91) One could argue that the continued operation of the apparatus within PL-controlled Laos should count for something, but by this point, that is essentially government activity.

 The same could be said for the installation of PL police in the rightist capital of Vientiane. As a stipulation in the 1973 agreement, police and troops would be stationed there to prevent a repeat of the 1957’s imprisoning of Prince Souphanouvon during the first coalition or 1962’s bout of traded assassinations.[[92]](#footnote-92) The most that can be said is that the application of people’s courts before the war ended—even the takeover of policing duties by PL officers could be seen as an extension of extant official capacity. The people’s courts allowed the PL to liquidate officials they deemed corrupt and consolidate their control over the Laotian buraeucracy.[[93]](#footnote-93)

**Nicaragua (1978-1979)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), Broad Opposition Front (FAO), other assorted anti-Somoza groups / Republic of Nicaragua

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 Nicaragua’s brief civil war led to the toppling of the Somoza dictatorship and the installation of a government dominated by the Sandinistas. The rebels themselves belonged to one of three groups, advocates of prolonged political opposition (Proletarians), advocates of a Mao-style People’s War (GPP), and advocates of military action, and advocates of constructing a broad alliance of anti-Somoza groups and waging a military campaign against the regime.[[94]](#footnote-94) The latter ultimately prevailed, attracting support from an alliance of liberal groups called the FAO with the promise of postwar democratization.[[95]](#footnote-95)

 This promise was not that Nicaragua would become a liberal democracy[[96]](#footnote-96) (and some in the movement chafed at the notion that any sort of democratization was in the works).[[97]](#footnote-97) The new regime would encourage popular participation, but only in support of the new regime’s immediate goals. One could argue that the mode of rebel governance adopted by the Sandinistas reflects this. Participation in the revolution was encouraged, but anything not directly related thereto took a back seat. They had set up nominally independent Civil Defense Committees (CDC) for this purpose.[[98]](#footnote-98) Their independence might have spurred the development of governance, but this did not take place, perhaps due to the war’s brevity.

 The CDCs did on occasion provide healthcare—a scarce resource given the damage done to existing facilities. Doctors were recruited to teach emergency surgery techniques and provide what care and materials they could.[[99]](#footnote-99) While providing healthcare (and food, on occasion) is noteworthy, this is the extent of the CDCs governance functions.[[100]](#footnote-100) One could argue that the CDCs’ patrols could provide something like policing, but the immediate postwar policing struggles and the apparent lack of experienced officers domestically[[101]](#footnote-101) suggest this was not the case.

 Interestingly, they were repurposed as Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) after the war’s end. Without the war to concern themselves with, they became the sort of cites of local participation, policymaking,[[102]](#footnote-102) and public good provision one associates with rebel governance.[[103]](#footnote-103) Also, one could argue that their experience might represent a means of circumventing the need for governance as a prerequisite for cultivating consciousness. After all, contributing to a revolution involves both contestation and participation.[[104]](#footnote-104) At the same time, one could say the same for any conflict in which fighters are recruited locally. While this is a phenomenon worth studying[[105]](#footnote-105) (and may well contribute to democratization), it is not governance.

 What does count is the FSLN’s involvement in political organizing. Two noteworthy examples are the association of Rural Workers (ATC) and the Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC). The latter served as an important source of recruits during the conflict. By the end of the conflict, rebels recruited in this manner were taking on positions of military leadership with some leading full battalions.[[106]](#footnote-106) The former was holding internal elections, creating policy platforms, and serving as a major de facto proletarian organization during the conflict.[[107]](#footnote-107) Technically, both organizations were independent. However, the FSLN was instrumental in encouraging both to join the revolution, transforming AMPRONAC from a forum to a militant organization.[[108]](#footnote-108) The Sandinistas’ role in the ATC was similar—it began as a means of airing grievances against landowners and became a vehicle for political organizing and making demands regarding conditions. After the war’s end, the ATC was one of the few means by which political activity beyond supporting the Sandinista government was possible.[[109]](#footnote-109)

**Nigeria (1967-1970)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of Biafra / Nigeria

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

After a military coup led by ethnic Igbo officers toppled Nigeria’s democracy in 1966, a counter-coup and pogroms against Igbos in the country’s northern regions led to civil war when Biafra declared its independence. Biafra was defeated in 1970 and the would-be country was reabsorbed into Nigeria, but in the meantime more than 2 million Igbo perished from starvation due to Nigeria’s blockade of the breakaway region. Whether this constituted a genocide remains a point of contention—on one hand Igbo were not targeted as much elsewhere, but on the other hand the Nigerian government’s blockade caused 15% of Biafra’s population to starve.[[110]](#footnote-110)

The war itself is something of an oddity in a post-WWII world. Although the Biafran army was disorganized and many of its fighters were inexperienced or generally unprepared for a “European” style conflict,[[111]](#footnote-111) they constituted the bulk of Biafra’s combat capabilities. For the most part, guerilla fighters were quite rare. Even civil defense units wore uniforms until late in the conflict.[[112]](#footnote-112) This bears witness to the fact that although it was short-lived, Biafra was an independent state that had a robust administrative apparatus. Much of it was inherited and it responded poorly to the pressures of war, but it existed nonetheless.

 The most successful element of this apparatus was the police force and judiciary, which continued to function until the state itself crumbled towards the war’s conclusion.[[113]](#footnote-113) Moreover, the would-be state supplemented these functions with Civil Defense Councils, which constituted an attempt to bolster Biafra’s administrative capacity alongside civilian-run directorates which helped distribute public goods, particularly food.[[114]](#footnote-114) However, there were many shortcomings to this governing apparatus. For one, this was the extent of popular input. One imagines that had Biafra won its civil war, it might conduct elections as Nigeria had just before Biafra’s genesis, but the point stands. Also, the Civil Defense Councils were born out of a need to compensate for the fact that the government lacked the wherewithal to control the population outside of large population centers. While the councils helped, the deficiency remained.[[115]](#footnote-115)

 The distribution apparatus was particularly uninspiring. The directorates were tasked not only with distributing food to civilians, but also to the army.[[116]](#footnote-116) Even before the administrative apparatus crumbled in the face of Biafra’s collapse, it appears that the directorates privileged the latter over the former, yet Biafran soldiers still developed a reputation for being “always hungry.”[[117]](#footnote-117) Additionally, while the directorates produced some surprising successes,[[118]](#footnote-118) it appears that they did little to organize or bolster education or health services. Most schools ceased functioning and the few that continued to run had to adopt policies of ending by 10 AM or relocating into the bush.[[119]](#footnote-119)

 The conclusion from all of this seems to be that even though this civil service was staffed by civilians, the state’s civil service was often compelled to serve military purposes before addressing civilian concerns.[[120]](#footnote-120) The incorporation of civilians suggests that at some point these institutions might be used in a consultative fashion, but this did not happen in the conflict. The same can be said for what institutions existed that might have otherwise been seen as representative—had Biafra won the war, they might have become effective consultative instruments. They did not reach their potential during the conflict, though.[[121]](#footnote-121)

**Pakistan (1971)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Mukti Bahini / Pakistan

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 Pakistan’s military junta began Operation Searchlight in March of 1971. This program was meant to destroy secessionist tendencies—specifically the pro-independence Awami League who had performed well in the 1970 parliamentary elections—by taking control of all of then-East Pakistan’s major population centers and killing any member of the Awami League they found along with anyone else who resists. This ultimately lead to a genocidal death toll, to say nothing of other forms of violence visited upon Bengalis.[[122]](#footnote-122) India intervened covertly as early as May by providing materiel to the rebels.[[123]](#footnote-123) By September, they were training Mukti Bahini troops and (according to some unconfirmed reports) with paramilitary personnel fighting alongside the rebels in plain clothes before intervening directly and in force December.[[124]](#footnote-124) The direct confrontation lasted twelve days, with Pakistani forces routed and what is now Bangladesh in the hands of the Mukti Bahini and their Indian patrons.

 Although the Mukti Bahini were capable of waging guerilla warfare by the time India directly intervened,[[125]](#footnote-125) they held little territory. However, Bengalis held sway over small portions of the country. Reports of governance are sparse, but more common are reports suggesting that Urdu speakers suffered horrors comparable to those suffered by Bengalis at the hands of the Pakistani forces.[[126]](#footnote-126) The one instance of governance that can be said to have taken place was the meeting in Mujibnagar by elected members of the Awami League who had been prevented from to taking their seats to contribute to what was to be Pakistan’s new constitution. On April 17th, they penned a Proclamation of Independence declaring the formation of a new government.[[127]](#footnote-127) While this is only a single event, it happened in the midst of the war and was done by elected members of the eventual rebel group in broad accordance with the goals of that rebel group.

**Pakistan (1973-1977)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Various groups which coalesced around the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) / Pakistan

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 In 1973, disappointed by the lack of influence of his ruling Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and wishing to bring the region into the fold, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto dispatched the army to the region and dismissed the provincial assemblies. This led to revolt, sparking a secessionist insurgency. Not nearly as brutal as the conflict that led to Bangladesh’s secession, the war ended 1977 with a total death toll of about 9,000 and Pakistan declaring victory.[[128]](#footnote-128)

 The insurgency was largely disorganized.[[129]](#footnote-129) Beyond the convictions that Baluchistan should be independent and that the region’s mineral wealth could sustain such a venture, little held the insurgency together, even at its conclusion.[[130]](#footnote-130) In fact, many wished for more autonomy within Pakistan rather than outright independence at the war’s outset.[[131]](#footnote-131) Even the BPLF only represented a loose affiliation.[[132]](#footnote-132) It was not until after the war that the independence movement began to organize a trans-tribal network to organize its activity.[[133]](#footnote-133)

 This is somewhat surprising given the growing provision of goods in the 1960s.[[134]](#footnote-134) However, the accounts of the conflict make no mention of attempts to govern or continue providing goods during the 1970s.[[135]](#footnote-135) Moreover, a survey of Baluchistan’s public goods provision conducted after the war found few facilities, particularly where healthcare was concerned.[[136]](#footnote-136) There is even mention that despite the nominal Marxist perspective of the BPLF, the group opposed radical changes to Baluch society or even political education.[[137]](#footnote-137)

**Sri Lanka (1971)**

Rebels / Incumbents: People’s Liberation Front (JVP) / Ceylon

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 The JVP was founded in 1965, when a group of leftist youths bemoaned the lack of a “pure Marxist revolutionary party” and so endeavored to make one to mobilize the masses.[[138]](#footnote-138) Criticism of their rhetoric from a Marxist standpoint notwithstanding,[[139]](#footnote-139) the group had a substantial following by 1970, when the group opted to contest elections. Disappointed by the slow pace of political change, they then opted for a more radical strategy.[[140]](#footnote-140)

In April of 1971, JVP began a nationwide uprising, attacking police stations and cutting electricity and communication lines along the way.[[141]](#footnote-141) Within weeks, the insurgency was subdued, [[142]](#footnote-142) but some argue that it lingered on for months.[[143]](#footnote-143) Save the first few weeks, though, it appears that the group did not control any substantial territory.[[144]](#footnote-144) The brevity of the conflict along with a lack of popular input[[145]](#footnote-145) (or even members of the group’s leadership who did not belong to the group’s leader Rohana Wijeweera’s caste) meant that the group struggled to garner popular legitimacy before the movement was crushed.[[146]](#footnote-146)

**Sudan (1963-1972)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Anya Nya, Azania Liberation Front (ALF) / Sudan

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 The first Sudanese civil war has its roots in a 1955 mutiny of Southern soldiers against the still coalescing power in the north and the effects of the transition to post-colonial Sudan.[[147]](#footnote-147) For almost a decade, the conflict continued at extremely low levels, with largely disorganized rebels relying on theft for materiel and limited to ambushes of police and locally stationed soldiers operationally.[[148]](#footnote-148) It was not until 1963, though, with the founding of the Anya Nya, that the war became intense enough to be recognized. In the beginning, beyond this ramping up of hostilities, the conflict more or less continued as it had,[[149]](#footnote-149) with more frequent attacks on police and military personnel in the South under the command of General Taffeng and the newly christened Anya Nya banner.[[150]](#footnote-150) However, by 1964, Anya Nya were attempting to capture entire towns.[[151]](#footnote-151)

 One substantial political development from the time was the proposal for the establishment of the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG). Besides an extensive ministerial staff to make policy on health, juridical, and educational matters (to name a few), it also included provisions empowering local chiefs and organizing elected councils at the regional and provincial levels.[[152]](#footnote-152) Although some of these proposals were actually into practice,[[153]](#footnote-153) the project was ultimately a failure. While seen as a means of bringing the purely political Sudan African National Union and the combatant Anya Nya into concert with one another, it was riven by internal rivalries from the beginning in August of 1967 and had little sway over the Anya Nya rebels.[[154]](#footnote-154)

 The SSPG did have an impact despite its influence shrinking to portions of Equatoria within a year.[[155]](#footnote-155) The SSPG divided the three southern provinces into nine administrative units, organizing regional, provincial, and district-level councils to help coordinate activities among both civil and military organizations. The inclusion of political officers substantially improved civil-military relations for a time, although this was short-lived.[[156]](#footnote-156) Eventually, it was replaced by the more regional Nile Provisional Government (NPG) in 1969, before being absorbed into the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) the year after.[[157]](#footnote-157) Before its absorption, though, the NPG did indeed select its short-lived president and vice president by way of election (albeit by delegates from the NPG’s purview).[[158]](#footnote-158)

 The SSLM also absorbed other regional political organizations into itself, ultimately helping to negotiate the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972.[[159]](#footnote-159) This ideally would concentrate the administrative capacity of Southern Sudan’s parallel administration into a single organization. Local chiefs had already been empowered to act as policing and juridical actors before the consolidation, and there were reports that abandoned infrastructure was being used to facilitate these functions.[[160]](#footnote-160) After the SSLM formed, there were attempts to provide training and coordination to the chiefs’ efforts, with some positive results. Reports of operational courts and schools—a sore subject in the South given Khartoum’s attempts at Arabization and Proselytizing via official curricula[[161]](#footnote-161)—were reasons for optimism regarding these efforts.[[162]](#footnote-162) Courts (ad-hoc and otherwise) and schools were indeed provided in Anya Nya territory, with Anya-Nya village scouts serving both as police and as liaison’s with local leadership.[[163]](#footnote-163) Education in particular began to make substantial strides towards the conflict’s end, with a teaching training center and the introduction of small forest schools.[[164]](#footnote-164)

 There were also efforts to provide some basic medical care, for instance, but to little effect. The government controlled the health system and had little trouble bombing those hospitals which resided in territory the rebels conquered.[[165]](#footnote-165) Moreover, when Southern Sudanese expats encouraged the World Health Organization to provide basic medical care (especially related to cholera treatment and prevention, they were stopped from doing so with the government arguing that there was not a single case of cholera in the whole country.[[166]](#footnote-166)

 Even aside from bombed out infrastructure, rebel governance in Southern Sudan was more impressive on paper than in reality. The regional governance organizations—like the SSPG and its successor the NPG—were generally seen as “dysfunctional.”[[167]](#footnote-167) Despite reportedly making progress after the SSLM consolidated governing efforts, actual provision was “sparse.”[[168]](#footnote-168)

**Uganda (1978-1979)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Uganda National Liberation Army, Front (UNLA, UNLF) / Uganda

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 The brief war to oust Idi Amin was technically a civil war in that the UNLA fought to overthrow the government, but Tanzania’s role looms large. Originally, Ugandan forces had been gearing up to invade Tanzania by way of the Kagera salient with the aim of annexing that territory. Although the ostensible goal of this planned invasion was to reinforce Amin’s position, it instead galvanized forces at home and abroad to overthrow him.[[169]](#footnote-169)

 Despite uniting for their common purpose, writing a constitution, and assuming control of the postwar government, the UNLF was hardly an effective political party. With no experience themselves and facing the challenge of administering a country whose governance apparatus had been ransacked and looted by its incumbents, they struggled mightily.[[170]](#footnote-170) One of the issues is this lack of experience—or indeed, the lack of governing purpose prior to seizing the capital, although they were to assume governing responsibility at that point.[[171]](#footnote-171) Another was the fact that the group was a mishmash of several different groups with wildly different agendas (beyond overthrowing Amin) and ideologies.[[172]](#footnote-172) Lastly, the group was quite small—only about 1,000 at the beginning of the invasion.[[173]](#footnote-173) Over the few months between beginning to fight and taking the capital of Kampala, they did no governing.

**Vietnam (1960-1975)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Viet Cong (VC) / Republic of Vietnam

**Policing/Juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 One can make a persuasive argument that the civil war in the Republic of Vietnam was not a civil war but an invasion. The VC and National Liberation Front (NLF) was effectively controlled by the Hanoi government,[[174]](#footnote-174) making differentiating the two perilously difficult. Mark Atwood Lawrence attempts to provide an answer to the conflict’s nature, arguing that the conflict was both a civil war *and* an invasion.[[175]](#footnote-175) In any case, the war in question begins in 1960 with the formation of the NLF from residual elements who had defeated the French. At Hanoi’s insistence, the war took on the character of a rural insurgency, slowly building up strength and replacing local administrators and administration.[[176]](#footnote-176)

In the beginning, the movement sought to co-opt local grievances against South Vietnam’s government, aiding dissident villages in separating themselves from the government by replacing official administration. Each VC cadre achieved this in a slightly different manner, as its decentralized organization allowed each cadre to tailor policies to the village in question.[[177]](#footnote-177) There are some consistent patterns across the conflict, however.

 For instance, alongside aggressive land reform,[[178]](#footnote-178) VC taxes were voluntary in the early 1960s. However, this would not last, as the VC’s plans involved transitioning from asking for support to demanding it.[[179]](#footnote-179) Beyond making taxes compulsory, the first exercises in direct control were the targeting of potential critics of the revolution—essentially, anyone with the moral fortitude and public standing to stand up to the VC. By doing this, the VC slowly eroded Vietnam’s villages from resisting the revolution.[[180]](#footnote-180)

 To further undermine traditional ties in favor of communal or party ones, VC cadres also provided clinics and schools in villages they controlled.[[181]](#footnote-181) This encouraged villagers to rely on the parties, but it also served as a propaganda dispensary and symbol. The political education in schools constituted one element of this. Also, in organizing its medical council, the South Vietnamese communists were able to urge the government to aid in stamping out cholera epidemics, claiming in this case to transcend the conflict and emphasize the importance of saving lives,[[182]](#footnote-182) even as VC cadres attacked government workers sent to control outbreaks of malaria.[[183]](#footnote-183) Actual provision, particularly of medical care, was less impressive than the propaganda it generated.[[184]](#footnote-184) Facilities often had insufficient medicine and qualified personnel, and the facilities themselves also had to provide healthcare for wounded fighters.[[185]](#footnote-185)

 There were also opportunities to participate in this system. During the mid-1960s, village councils were elected and contributed to administering the villages themselves, particularly where the distribution of land was concerned.[[186]](#footnote-186) Moreover, while political officers were individually vetted by high command, they often began as platoon leaders among the VC.[[187]](#footnote-187)

 VC administration emphasized controlling villagers by way of “discriminate violence” as soon as they were able to do so.[[188]](#footnote-188) To this end, the cadres practiced an especially brutal form of “justice,” applying heavy punishments for purported enemies of the revolution by the latter half of the 1960s.[[189]](#footnote-189) This was a continuation of the NLF’s early legitimations for using violence. POWs were said to have been “arrested, tried, and convicted of crimes against the people” and were only released upon their “appeal for clemency.”[[190]](#footnote-190) Within the villages, cadres used “reeducation” to punish supposed wrongdoings. Each of these euphemisms were useful—the former gave the air of legalism, the latter of mildness. However, reeducation was hardly more than an indeterminate sentence—some were never seen again while others returned ill. The accused could be defended (assuming there was a public trial), but villagers rarely did so, for fear that they might be implicated as well.[[191]](#footnote-191) In addition to this, within each VC camp was a unit assigned to assist local village and hamlet level fighters in “arresting brawlers, gamblers, thieves, robbers, juvenile delinquents, and prostitutes.”[[192]](#footnote-192)

**Yemen (1962-1970)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Royalists / Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)

**Policing/Juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative Instruments: 0**

 Following a coup d’état in September of 1962, supporters of the absconded Imam Badr, son of the recently deceased Imam Ahmed of the Hamid-ud-Din dynasty, began a war to re-establish the monarchy. The coup had been a success and the new republic was widely recognized around the world. Despite their perilous post-coup position, the Royalists were able to rely on their Saudi patrons to continue the war effort until 1970.[[193]](#footnote-193)

The YAR also heavily relied on international patrons—specifically Egypt. After the calamitous defeat in the 6-Day War, Egypt withdrew and agreed alongside Saudi Arabia to let the war play itself out from the sidelines. With both sides unable to score ultimate victories, moderates among the Republicans and Royalists were able to negotiate a peaceful reconciliation.[[194]](#footnote-194)

 It also appears as though there were few (if any) attempts to establish a rebel governance apparatus. Supporters of one side defected to the other at various points in time,[[195]](#footnote-195) and beyond supporting or opposing the war efforts there was little relationship between belligerent and civilian, even among the new incumbents.[[196]](#footnote-196) As such, one can conclude that the Royalists did not invest much concern in governing beyond putting Imam Badr back on the throne.

**Zimbabwe (1972-1979)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) / Rhodesia

**Policing/Juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative Instruments: 1**

 During the 1950s and 1960s, African leaders sought to overturn Rhodesia’s racist constitution which guaranteed rule by its white minority. Their efforts were non-violent, relying on a political process to deliver the desired result. The Rhodesian government responded by banning nationalist organizations and by imprisoning their leadership.[[197]](#footnote-197) These groups (ZANU and ZAPU) eventually resorted to using force of arms to challenge the regime.

Rhodesian forces inflicted enormous suffering on Zimbabwe’s population. With aid from South Africa, they targeted the civilian population with their air force.[[198]](#footnote-198) They also instituted a policy of “protected villages”[[199]](#footnote-199) in which civilians were spared from the bombardment, but at a heavy cost. Disease was rampant, food was scarce, housing consisted of corrugated metal which conducted heat during the day but provided little shelter at night, women and girls were subject to sexual assaults by the guards, and all who were able were compelled to till the fields without pay.[[200]](#footnote-200) To make matters worse, strict curfews were adopted, after which anyone found outside was shot. Many had difficulty following the curfew as time pieces were in short supply.[[201]](#footnote-201) Among other things, these measures made operating within Rhodesia quite difficult for ZANU and ZAPU guerillas.

 Despite this, they were able to establish some bases within Rhodesia in 1973 although they continued to rely on operations which began outside Rhodesia’s borders.[[202]](#footnote-202) Within these bases, the rebels were generally successful at providing public goods towards the conflict’s ending. ZANU had an ambitious plan to provide education by the final years of the war, but until the war was over its ability to achieve its goals were hamstrung by a desperate lack of resources and the fact that its headquarters was bombed on numerous occasions.[[203]](#footnote-203) One reason for the delayed effectiveness was the difficult security situation—even posting a couple guards was sufficient provocation for Rhodesian troops to raid a camp. However, the cadres themselves also resented having to develop a system of education.[[204]](#footnote-204) Nevertheless, its educational program was producing results inside the country during the late 1970s.[[205]](#footnote-205) There were also several clinics and hospitals established by the rebels, amply staffed by nurses and medical officers. However, their function was hampered by the propensity by rebel forces to impress women into sexual servitude at any opportunity, even among women serving as soldiers in the war.[[206]](#footnote-206)

 Using these bases, Zimbabwe’s rebels were able to provide a small measure of law and order. In addition to ad hoc of recriminations for supposed “sell-outs” at political meetings,[[207]](#footnote-207) the rebels were able to construct a rudimentary court system in some areas, especially Mashonaland. The guerillas or the local political committee would hear disputes and adjudicate them. Many of these were of a political nature, but as the war began to wind down, more and more private disputes were handled by these “courts.”[[208]](#footnote-208)

 Village committees which the rebels encouraged had substantial impacts beyond this as well. This impact was primarily keeping lookout for hostile individuals and organizing the collection and delivery of supplies to rebels (as opposed to making policy), but the officers within the committee were elected to their positions. Despite the substantial risks of individuals engaged in these activities, the rebels were unable to protect members of these committees from government forces, forcing them to thread the needle between supporting the independence cause and not arousing suspicion among government agents.[[209]](#footnote-209)

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5. Aiden Russell, “Rebel and Rule in Burundi, 1972,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 48, No. 1 (2015), 85-87 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
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8. Douglas Pike, “Cambodia’s War,” *Southeast Asian Perspectives* 1 (1971), 12-17. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
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13. Pike, “Cambodia’s War,” 33-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Quinn, “Political Change in Wartime,” 8-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid. 18-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Thomas Clayton, “Building the New Cambodia: Educational Destruction and Construction under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979,” *History of Education* Quarterly 38, No. 1 (1998), 5-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Quinn, “Political Change in Wartime,” 8-9, 18-21. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
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27. F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, “Relations with Greece and the Balkans,” in *Turkish Foreign Policy in and Age of Uncertainty*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 78-79. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
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50. Mark Lewis, “Historical Setting,” *Iraq: a country study*, ed. Helen Chapin Metz, (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. O’Ballance, *Kurdish Revolt*, 123. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 316-317; moreover, it appears as though the presiding officers in each assembly would be better described as allies than cronies—the plan for the assemblies was to assuage political rivals that it would be neutral (see: 316). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. O’Ballance, *Kurdish Revolt*, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
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55. Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, “Iraqi Kurdistan, 1961-1975 Case Outcome: COIN Win” in *Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 216-218; that is to say nothing regarding the military, though. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
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58. David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 337-339 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Paul et al, “Iraqi Kurdistan,” 220-223 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
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