**Afghanistan (1978-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Several (Sunni and Shia Mujahedeen parties and militias)[[1]](#footnote-1) / Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The first of Afghanistan’s civil wars to fall within the timeline of the dataset began in April of 1978 with a bloody coup d’état perpetrated by USSR-backed Afghan Communists against president Mohammed Daoud Khan, who had been a vocal proponent of reducing Soviet influence in the country and returning it to genuine non-aligned status.[[2]](#footnote-2) The resultant Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) would be dissolved at war’s end, but the disparate nature of the resistance to the new regime (among other things) made large-scale governance projects remarkably difficult.

 For both incumbent and rebel, there was a profound lack of unity, both along ethnic and religious lines.[[3]](#footnote-3) In spite of this, regional powers asserted some degree of control after the Soviet withdrawal. Outside the capital Kabul (one of the few areas where Mohammad Najibullah’s incumbent government maintained control), five warlords maintained territory throughout the countryside. In spite of this, no governance outcomes could emerge; what paper institutions did emerge provided no benefits and were popularly disregarded and those were few and far between, in spite of efforts to encourage political development within the militias themselves on the part of the government.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 Ahmad Shah Massoud was able to develop an administrative apparatus (dubbed the Supervisory Council of the North) in his controlled territory in Afghanistan’s northern and western frontiers. There is substantial disagreement regarding how effective these efforts were, though. While the SCN “included sub-councils consisting of commanders, religious leaders, and village elders” and had six committees which “dealt with finance, health, education and culture, political affairs (including Kabuli affairs) and information,”[[5]](#footnote-5) another scholar notes the organization’s genesis as a means to military ends and argues that “some of this organization existed on paper – or in Massoud’s mind – more than in reality.”[[6]](#footnote-6) In the absence of evidence speaking to these instruments’ effectiveness aside from noting the prodigious size of this organization and its functions of health, education, and foodstuff provision,[[7]](#footnote-7) this qualifies for an intermediate score regarding public goods provision.[[8]](#footnote-8)

 **Afghanistan (1992-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Taliban and various allied parties and militias / Islamic State of Afghanistan and various allied parties and militias

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Following the fall of the Najibullah government, the UN-negotiated Peshawar Accord attempted to bring many of the erstwhile independent groups and what remained of the collapsed state’s infrastructure and personnel under a common banner—The Islamic State of Afghanistan.[[9]](#footnote-9) This proved predictably difficult, with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of the fundamentalist Sunni Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami, rejecting the post of Prime Minister, preferring to play the role of “total spoiler” until the full extent of his agenda is achieved or granted (although also motivated by a deep and resentful rivalry with the leader of the Tajik group Jamiat-i-Islami, Ahmad Shah Massoud).[[10]](#footnote-10) Hekmatyar’s spoiling behavior contributed to the eventual downfall of the already tenuous tenure of President Burhanuddin Rabbani at the hands of the ascendant Taliban.

 In spite of their grand pronouncements regarding the restoration of law and order, the Taliban were exceptionally poor governors, even after the war.[[11]](#footnote-11) There is little evidence of any efforts to build up the state’s capacity in Mampillian terms. Moreover, Taliban leadership did not view such goals as important—military conquest was viewed as far more critical to their agenda. The only governance project at which the Taliban tried their hand was policing, but observers take pains to differentiate this from the establishment of law and order. Instead, the group employed extraordinary violence and cruelty to secure obedience from subject populations. Fear of a grizzly fate ensured order in their controlled territories, not the rule of law. Lastly, manifestations of non-policing governance goods were enthusiastically attacked.

 There is an argument that Mohammed Ismail Khan’s relative success in governing the Western city of Herat could constitute some small measure of rebel governance.[[12]](#footnote-12) He had been able to provide some degree of policing, justice, and public good provision, but he was also afiiliated with Jamiat-i-Islami, a group represented prominently within the government. As such, even though he operated with a large degree of autonomy, it is perhaps misleading to call this rebel governance. Although he was able to return to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban’s government, he fled into exile in 1995 as the Taliban began to assert their control over large swaths of the country.

**Afghanistan (1996-2001)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Former elements of The Islamic State of Afghanistan / The Emirate of Afghanistan (The Taliban)

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 With the ascendance of the Taliban, The remnants of the Islamic State of Afghanistan retreated northward. In spite of the incorporation of Hekmatyar into ISA’s government as prime minister in 1996,[[13]](#footnote-13) these remnants were beaten back to the northeastern corner of the country at their nadir in 1998.[[14]](#footnote-14) Until American involvement in the conflict after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Islamic State and Emirate traded off gains and losses, with some towns captured, lost, and recaptured in relatively short order.[[15]](#footnote-15)

 It can be argued that Abdul Rashid Dostum, a one-time Communist officer turned militia leader, had been successful in creating a pocket of governance in Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Shiberghan.[[16]](#footnote-16) Similarly to Ismail Khan, Dostum was able to use what infrastructure remained from the Communist era to provide some semblance of governance. Dostum, like Ismail Khan, was aligned with the Islamic State of Afghanistan, so it would not be accurate to describe him as a rebel (in spite of the difficulties differentiating between the groups amid constant alliance portfolio shuffling) until 1996. Thereafter, in spite of his notorious cruelty, regions under his control enjoyed a measure of domestic security and institutionalized education.[[17]](#footnote-17) He was able to maintain some measure of control until 1998, when (aided by a mutinous lieutenant) the Taliban were able to defeat his considerable forces and chase Dostum into exile.

 The same cannot be said about Dostum’s rival, Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose Panjsher Valley enclave was held in some form or fashion until American intervention.[[18]](#footnote-18) Beyond providing a modicum of security from Taliban forces, little is known about Massoud’s record as a governor in these intervening years. However, it is known that he was even more successful at rebuffing Taliban offensives than he was at doing so against Soviet forces in the 1980’s, leading to limited (and largely theoretical) recognition of the Northern Alliance as an opposition group on the part of the Taliban.[[19]](#footnote-19)

**Algeria (1992-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), Armed Islamic Group (GIA) / Algeria

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The Algerian Civil War came in the wake of a military coup which prevented the victorious FIS from taking power.[[20]](#footnote-20) In the wake of the coup, Islamist militias took up arms to challenge the state. While FIS-aligned fighters initially fought to secure the fruits of their electoral victory, the GIA fought to destabilize the state. The profound violence that the groups employed (especially the GIA) made holding the groups together difficult, to say nothing of their attempts to govern.[[21]](#footnote-21)

The GIA fought to overturn the state and was ideologically opposed to any compromise of that goal.[[22]](#footnote-22) This ideology was a powerful recruitment tool, but desertion quickly became an issue as the group exercised extreme cruelty when dealing with civilians (many of whom were Muslim themselves). This ideology—in particular its forswearing of dialogue—led to an interesting development.[[23]](#footnote-23) While the coup is generally seen as the cause de guerre, the GIA were uninterested in becoming a legal political party (The FIS lost legal status in the wake of the coup). The Islamist’s group’s single-minder pursuit of the liquidation of the state above left little room for governance (although it did apparently give support to the hardline military position on the matter).[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Angola (1975-1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) / Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 0**

**Angola (1989-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 0**

**Angola (1992-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 0**

**Angola (1998-2002)**

Rebels / Incumbents: UNITA / MPLA

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

See Case Study Chapter

**Azerbaijan (1991-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Nagorno-Karabakh / Azerbaijan

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 One could be forgiven for thinking that the civil war in Azerbaijan was, in fact, an interstate one. After all, Azerbaijani and Armenian forces clashed during the conflict. However, the war was one of secession for the Armenian majority in the Azerbaijani district of Nagorno-Karabakh.[[25]](#footnote-25) In part due to support from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh secessionists were able to achieve a certain degree of governance during the war in addition to holding its declared territories.

 Although some have argued that this was spurred by international pressure, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians did hold elections for their newly created parliament beginning in 1992,[[26]](#footnote-26) although direct presidential elections did not take place until after the war’s end.[[27]](#footnote-27) In spite of these elections (and its de-facto control and administration of its territory), formal recognition has not been forthcoming.[[28]](#footnote-28) Consultative instruments also manifested themselves as secessionists conducted a much ballyhooed independence referendum in late 1991. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of secession, although it is worth noting that Azerbaijanis boycotted the referendum.[[29]](#footnote-29) Further diminishing these wartime achievements is the fact that the first elements of NKR’s parallel government manifested themselves well before the war commenced, meaning that the NKR was a rebel government before it was, technically, a rebellious organization.[[30]](#footnote-30)

 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians also maintained a police force which was clearly distinct from its military.[[31]](#footnote-31) However, the military enjoyed pride of place which allowed for occasional improprieties—and not simply because of the war. Armenian assistance meant that the army was perhaps the best organized element of the emerging secessionist republic.[[32]](#footnote-32)

**Bosnia (1992-1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republika Srpska / Bosnia-Herzegovina

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The Bosnian War was not so much a civil war as it was a series of civil wars. One such conflict was that which manifested itself in the newly independent Bosnia and its secessionist (and perhaps annexation-minded) Serbian minority. With the aid of also-independent Serbia and what remained of the Yugoslav infrastructure, Bosnia’s secessionist Serbs were in a position to make substantial gains quickly from early on in the conflict.[[33]](#footnote-33)

 While the territorial gains did not quite match this advantageous position,[[34]](#footnote-34) it is still somewhat surprising that the secessionist state did not establish itself as a state during the conflict. Policing functions were particularly desultory, even in the wake of the conflict.[[35]](#footnote-35) Similarly, Republika Srpska did not conduct any free elections during the conflict, in spite of its claims to represent the interests of Bosnian Serbs.[[36]](#footnote-36) While Bosniak authorities made some efforts to make education reforms,[[37]](#footnote-37) little evidence exists that Republika Srpska was interested in producing public goods.

**Burma/Myanmar (1948-1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Communist Party of Burma (CPB) / Union of Burma (until 1962); Burma (thereafter)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The CPB began operations in the country as soon as Burma secured its independence from Great Britain.[[38]](#footnote-38) This presented the fledgling country with a profound challenge, particularly given the ethnic resentments which also began to manifest itself at independence.[[39]](#footnote-39) CPB’s “invasion” of Burma did not formally begin until some years after Ne Win’s coup established a military dictatorship in the country, though.

 The CPB relied heavily on Chinese patronage, but it had a relatively well-articulated ideology and ultimate agenda.[[40]](#footnote-40)At independence, they adopted a distinctly Leninist footing—their goal was to lead a popular revolution to destroy the Burmese state so it could be remade in the CPB’s image. To support this end, the organization developed an impressive array of mass mobilization organizations and a more or less functional taxation system.[[41]](#footnote-41) Unfortunately, its mobilization efforts produced little effect beyond impressive membership lists. Indeed, once Chinese patronage faltered, the group’s non-revenue collection political functions ceased to operate in any meaningful fashion.

 In spite of the group’s size and (at least nominal) support,[[42]](#footnote-42) the group privileged military gains over political developments in their controlled territories.[[43]](#footnote-43) The group faltered militarily after China withdrew its support, especially as the Burmese military stepped up anti-insurgent operations in the wake of the 8888 campaign. After a string of defeats, the CPB collapsed in 1989. Interestingly, the CPB’s acquisitiveness reveals itself in the groups that sprang up from the group’s dissolution, as these groups focused increasingly on profiting from the drug trade. [[44]](#footnote-44)

**Burma (1960-1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Ethnic insurgent movements (Some include the Karen National Union (KNU), Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and Shan State Army (SSA)) / Union of Burma (until 1962); Burma (thereafter)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The second of Myanmar’s civil wars in the dataset has its roots around the time that the CPB began fighting, as ethnic resentments precluded the national unity promised by the 1947 constitution.[[45]](#footnote-45) These resentments led to the conflict’s reignition as the Union of Burma began to falter in 1960. Perhaps because of the Burmese state’s inability to administer its hinterlands,[[46]](#footnote-46) several rebel movements were able to develop and thrive over course of the 20th Century’s remainder. Unlike the CPB, some of these groups were successful in providing some of the goods of governance at various times during the conflict.

 Terrain and strategy made governance a bit easier for ethnic rebel groups in Burma. While the state waged campaigns against them, the groups themselves were more concerned with ridding their territory of Tatmadaw forces. This concern with their own affairs at the expense of seeking the destabilization of Ne Win’s regime allowed many of these groups to establish schools and clinics.[[47]](#footnote-47) The efficacy of public good provision in rebel-controlled territory leaves something to be desired (especially in healthcare) but their establishment bears mentioning all the same.[[48]](#footnote-48) Unfortunately, it also led to conflict amongst themselves and the CPB at various points in time.[[49]](#footnote-49)

 This concern with controlled territory meant that the 8888 uprising was largely a civil society phenomenon; ethnically defined rebel groups largely did not participate.[[50]](#footnote-50) One could more easily argue for the role of ethnic rebels in the 1990 elections, though.[[51]](#footnote-51) Burma’s intelligentsia went underground in the wake of the 8888 uprising, eventually leading to the establishment of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB). The group had a military wing—the National Democratic Front (NDF)—which was made up of 11 ethnically defined groups formed much earlier. This is important to note because of the peculiarities of the 1990 elections. Even DAB leadership assumed that the results would be falsified by the incumbent regime. What happened was even more bizarre; the results—a landslide victory for DAB—were released, but not honored.

 Finding evidence of policing and juridical in rebel-controlled Burma is a harder task. While it is clear that by 1990 the Burmese state had, to a certain degree, accepted rebel control of certain regions,[[52]](#footnote-52) little evidence exists that points to the operation of policing or justice within controlled territories. One could suppose that civil society actors may take on such responsibilities, but it appears that the rebels may not have.

**Burundi (1988)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Hutu militias / Burundi and Tutsi militias

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 This brief civil war took place shortly after Pierre Buyoya’s coup d’état, albeit not immediately so.[[53]](#footnote-53) Buyoya had intended (or claimed to have intended) to repair relations between the majority Hutu population and that of the Tutsi, who had ruled the country for decades.[[54]](#footnote-54) Unsatisfied by the regime’s progress, Hutus began to lash out at the Tutsi minority,[[55]](#footnote-55) leading to a brief conflict followed by brutal reprisals on behalf of the very regime which had promised to work toward interethnic peace.[[56]](#footnote-56)

 The war’s brevity made rebel governance highly unlikely. Even so, there were governance developments contemporary with the conflict. For instance, Burundi’s education system was in the midst of ambitious expansion in 1988.[[57]](#footnote-57) However, this was not done at the behest of those who participated in the uprising. Political developments would also emerge in the years that followed, but these are not examples of rebel governance, but merely developments coincidental with a brief civil war.

**Burundi (1993-2000)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD/CNDD), National Liberation Front (FROLINA), and National Forces of Liberation (FNL/PALIPEHUTU) / Burundian Armed Forces, Political Parties of the Opposition (PPO), Tutsi militias

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Shortly after adopting a new constitution in 1992, Burundi held elections in 1993. These elections ousted Pierre Buyoya in favor of Melchior Ndadaye by a wide margin. Not only was Ndadaye a Hutu, but he was a civilian; both of these traits alienated the ascendant Ndadaye from Burundi’s Tutsi military leadership. Following his assassination in October of 1993, Hutus committed massacres against Tutsi, which then led to military reprisals against Hutus. Hutus from Ndadaye’s party thus left the government to wage a war, ostensibly to restore democracy.[[58]](#footnote-58)

 Burundi’s rebels were not terribly effective governors, save for one aspect: collecting taxes.[[59]](#footnote-59) In part due to the war’s mobile nature and the difficulties holding territory for extended periods, rebel organizations did not provide health, educational, or even legal apparatuses for their would-be subjects. What they did do was regularly collect taxes. As Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Philip Verwimp point out, though, there were some benefits to the taxed. Although the rebels often did not spare the effort to create institutions, they could provide additional domestic security or muscle in enforcing the collection of personal debts.

 The exception appears to have been the CNDD, who by 1995 had established an impressive-seeming array of administrative apparatuses.[[60]](#footnote-60) While claiming to provide a wide array of goods one would associate with good governance,[[61]](#footnote-61) the actual output is somewhat limited. Early in the conflict, the group provided a means of voicing concerns to leadership as well as a “Forest Justice” court system to resolve disputes.[[62]](#footnote-62)

 Besides this, though, rebel governance apparatuses were scarce.[[63]](#footnote-63) A part of this may have been the flight of some of the Hutu political leadership, but regardless of the explanation, the emergent democracy had, for all intents and purposes, ceased to function at the beginning of the conflict. With that said, the negotiations which brought brief respite to the belligerents (and especially to the brutalized population) emphasized the need to restore the democratic institutions which had begun to bear fruit in the early 1990’s.

**Burundi (2001-2003)**

Rebels / Incumbents: CNDD, CNDD-FDD, new CNDD-FDD, PALIPEHUTU-FNL / Burundi, Tutsi militias

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The second chapter of the conflict began shortly after the first one ended, as the carefully crafted power-sharing agreement collapsed under the strain of factions within factions being left out of the negotiations, either because they were not invited or because they refused to participate.[[64]](#footnote-64) The government then attempted to negotiate cease fires with the different factions within CNDD individually, recognizing that the organization had become, for all intents and purposes, divided into three. Once these peace agreements had been signed, the country held elections once again, where the tenuously unified CNDD-FDD performed well, ostensibly because of its promises of change from the status quo ante and for “delivering” on the promise to incorporate more Hutus into security and defense forces at the war’s end.

 This may not come as a surprise given the relative success that the group had establishing a parallel administration, particularly when compared to the other groups.[[65]](#footnote-65) The CNDD were still not exemplary governors,[[66]](#footnote-66) but they continued to develop a parallel administration system, providing a means of registering concerns and adjudicating disputes.[[67]](#footnote-67) These continued to operate after the conflict, proving useful as the group sought electoral victory after making peace with the state in 2003.[[68]](#footnote-68) This incorporated the CNDD into the Burundian state, but it left the FNL out.[[69]](#footnote-69)

**Burundi (2004-2006)**

Rebels / Incumbents: PALIPEHUTU-FNL / CNDD factions, Burundi, Tutsi militias

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The final chapter in the conflict took place as the CNDD and Burundian armed forces collaborated against the last remaining rebel group: the FNL.[[70]](#footnote-70) After brutal offensives further victimized the country’s civilian population, the Burundian government signed a peace agreement with the FNL in 2006.[[71]](#footnote-71) This gave the CNDD a head start in transforming itself into a political party, as it was able to participate in the country’s elections in 2005.

 The FNL’s isolation did not make it an effective vehicle for governance. Service provision in general was not strong in the country, to be sure. For instance, access to education during the conflict was especially poor and uneven.[[72]](#footnote-72) However, the FNL did little to change this, in spite of its long-term control over rural Bujumbura and Bubanza for much of the conflict.[[73]](#footnote-73)

**Cambodia (1978-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (until 1979), People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK thereafter) Vietnam / Khmer Rouge (until 1982), Party of Democratic Kampuchea (1982 and thereafter, also known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK)), Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), FUNCINPEC party. After 1979, the polarity of incumbents and rebels inverts, with the unrecognized coalition government playing the part of the rebels.

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Identifying incumbents and rebels in the case of the Cambodian civil war is especially difficult. One reason for this is that the most powerful group in the conflict was a foreign state. Another is the fact that de jure control over the Cambodian state changed hands over the conflict’s course. The Khmer Rouge regime began the conflict as incumbents, but it was the victim of its own xenophobia. Concerned more by its saber-rattling along its shared border than by its abominable treatment of its populace, Vietnam invaded the country in 1978, overtaking Phnom Penh in 1979.[[74]](#footnote-74) Eventually, the routed remnants of DK were able to reform as a coalition government, incorporating two other parties to strengthen their claim to the Cambodian state. This claim would go generally unrecognized.

 This was, in part, due to Vietnam’s de facto control of Cambodia. The invaders were able to empower a remarkably resilient puppet regime, allowing it to consolidate itself while Vietnamese forces hunted remnants of the old regime.[[75]](#footnote-75) Beginning in 1984, Khmer Rouge insurgents were able to secure a stalemate, maintaining control over the Northwest regions of the country.[[76]](#footnote-76) In spite of this, the government-in-exile was not able to provide the goods of governance within its controlled territories.

 Although members of the coalition attempted to reach out to the population in Cambodia, they were not terribly successful in governing, in part due to the more pressing problem of the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh.[[77]](#footnote-77) Even their outreach programs ran into issues due to the unpopularity of the Khmer Rouge—while alliance with the old guard helped balance against the hostile forces in the capital, Cambodian memories of the old regime meant that the government-in-exile had enormous difficulties securing support. There is evidence that schools and clinics existed, but none that the groups themselves ran them.[[78]](#footnote-78)

 What each group did run were the “camps,” collections of civilians which were nominally under the groups’ protection. However, many observers noted that these camps provided little in the way of shelter, to say nothing of governance. The governance provided in these camps (or rather the lack thereof) pales in comparison of what the Vietnamese patrons of the PRK had.[[79]](#footnote-79) Human rights were trampled upon in each factions camps (fact-finding missions reported that PRK civilians dealt with similar issues, although some scholars question the sources of these reports).[[80]](#footnote-80)

 One of the most persistent issues in the camps is rampant criminality—despite the presence of soldiers, nothing like order had emerged. Cambodian state policing and juridical functions were rudimentary, even towards the conflict’s end, but they far outperformed those in rebel-controlled territory. Healthcare facilities existed in this territory, but civilians were barred from using them.[[81]](#footnote-81)

 A rare exception to this pattern is, ironically, the former KR rebels under the DK banner. The most noteworthy difference is the temporary presence of elected administration.[[82]](#footnote-82) This development may have been a part of DK’s efforts to rebrand itself as a pro-democratic party, but the temporary nature of the administration suggests that this may have been a cosmetic shift.[[83]](#footnote-83) For instance, the elected civilian leadership was removed for being too tolerant of criticism or of sympathetic positions regarding the other rebel groups.[[84]](#footnote-84)

 Another difference between DK camps and others is the relatively lower rate of criminality.[[85]](#footnote-85) DK forces set aside personnel to handle arrest, punishment, and release of prisoners. The purpose of this appears to be control of the population—individuals are not only not allowed to leave the camp, they are not allowed to “defect” to another DK camp.[[86]](#footnote-86)

 It appears that the KPNLF has a somewhat similar arrangement. In addition to efforts to enforce discipline,[[87]](#footnote-87) the group has also arranged for civilian and military administrators to participate in “Justice Committees” to handle especially serious crimes.[[88]](#footnote-88) While impressive in terms of the incorporation of civilians in their administration and in terms of institutionalizing the juridical apparatus, some observers were less impressed by these efforts. In particular, Asia Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch, noted that by the 1990s, the KPNLF had “lost control” of its forces and that whatever institutions had emerged in their controlled territory had ceased to function.[[89]](#footnote-89)

**Chad (1980-1988)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Liberation Front of Chad (FRONILAT), Armed Forces of the North (FAN) (until 1982); Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) (1982 and following) / GUNT (until 1982); FAN (1982 and following)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

Many of the civil wars listed here played out as hybrid conflicts, involving both domestic forces and foreigners. Sometimes these foreign states are patrons, as is the case with Libya in this particular conflict, coming on the heels of another civil war which had effectively broken the state. Because of this, identifying rebels and incumbents is exceptionally difficult, to the point that such distinctions may not be useful or even valid in this case. It is most accurate to say that the status of incumbent changes over the conflict. Goukouni Oueddei’s GUNT had established control over the country in the waning days of the previous civil war, but was only able to maintain control of what remained of the Chadian state until 1982. GUNT did not dissolve at this point—rather it became a rebel group. At this point, Hissène Habré’s Armed Forces of the North (FAN) became the incumbent, as it controlled the capital and was the de facto governing authority.[[90]](#footnote-90)

Prior to seizing power, FAN did little in the way of rebel governance.[[91]](#footnote-91) Similarly, GUNT’s attempts to administer its territory as an incumbent in the terms of this study were unsuccessful. On the other hand, GUNT (as well as several southern militias) made more concerted attempts to administer the territory they occupied and controlled. GUNT’s ability to operate and linger on, even considering its Libyan patrons, is almost unique—GUNT had been ousted from power, but yet it was able to retreat and reconstitute itself as a center-seeking “shadow government.”[[92]](#footnote-92)

Success in this enterprise was not forthcoming, though. Even though GUNT was able to linger due to FAN’s profoundly sub-Weberian control of Chad,[[93]](#footnote-93) GUNT’s position was hardly stable.[[94]](#footnote-94) In part, this was due to its status as a coalition, relying upon the loyalty of the Chadian Armed Forces (FAT), the People’s Armed Forces (FAP), and the Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR) in order to survive. This coalition proved to be exceptionally tenuous in the aftermath of GUNT’s defeat. To make matters worse, French and American support of Habré’s forces left GUNT in dire straits, eventually precluding the group’s ability to hold territory.[[95]](#footnote-95) Lastly, GUNT’s failures to govern during its time in government were not remedied when it “governed” in exile—its aim in operating away from the center was to defeat FAN militarily, something which it failed to achieve.

**Chad (1990-1998)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Several. Movement for Democracy and Development (anti-Habré: MDD; pro-Habré: MDD-fant), Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et la Démocratie (CSNPD), National Liberation Front of Chad (FRONILAT), National Council of Chadian Recovery (CNR), Action Forces for the Republic (FFAR) / Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The second violent chapter depicted herein begins with the deposing of Habré and the ascension of a new president: Idriss Déby. With the aid of his MPS, he was able to quickly establish de jure control of the Chadian state. However, conflict re-emerged as he retained his predecessor’s inability to control the length and breadth of the state. Indeed, Mario Acevedo argues that the degree of stability he was able to secure rested on his decision to not attempt to monopolize deadly force.[[96]](#footnote-96)

 Rebel governance in this second chapter was just as desultory as in the first. Many groups claimed—in accordance with their names—democratic purposes, but their predatory behavior betrays their acquisitive agendas.[[97]](#footnote-97) However, such claims were perhaps more useful, if not accurate, in this chapter of the conflict. After all, President Déby, unlike his predecessor, claimed to be a democrat. As such, criticism for his failing to provide consolidated democracy is far more persuasive than in the previous case[[98]](#footnote-98); Habré never claimed to be so, even as he noted that such developments could come about in a future interrupted by his ouster.[[99]](#footnote-99) Still, these critiques ring hollow given the inability or unwillingness to provide some sort of parallel legal basis of security,[[100]](#footnote-100) even as Déby’s forces showed a similar lack of discipline.[[101]](#footnote-101)

 This is not to say that Chad was entirely undemocratic. Due in large part to deals that Déby cut with many of the rebel groups, something vaguely resembling democracy was able to emerge in Chad during the mid-1990’s.[[102]](#footnote-102) Even though many of these “elections” are better described as exercises in elite bargaining than in securing public mandate to rule, Déby’s regime was able to survive the conflict by building coalitions with opposition rebel-groups-turned-political-parties. With that said, this represents rebel groups buying into the incumbent’s scheme for governing the state, not rebel governance manifesting itself as parallel to that state.

 Public goods were as hard to come by as other manifestations of governance. Other than a semi-regular means of extracting “taxes,” most of the rebel groups were unsuccessful in this venture.[[103]](#footnote-103) Although some independent schools were able to operate sporadically, the primary “good” which rebel groups purported to provide was security.

**Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1993-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Parti Congolais du Travail (PCT), The Mouvement Congolais pour le Developpement et la Democratie Integrale (MCDDI) / The Union Panafricaine pour la Democratie Sociale (UPADS)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The first Congolese civil war in the dataset took place over less than a year, during which time three militias clashed over control of the central African state.[[104]](#footnote-104) The catalyst of this conflict were the results of legislative elections which had President Pascal Lissouba’s UPADS party making significant gains.[[105]](#footnote-105) The PCT and MCDDI opposition parties rejected the results, leading to riots and clashes between each party’s militia.

 The conflict itself was a manifestation of how fragile Congo’s erstwhile democratization was at the time.[[106]](#footnote-106) President Lissouba and his UPADS party had just acceded to power after decades of PCT rule when, in the wake of a crumbling coalition he dissolved parliament. These actions would have rattled the stability of a consolidated state; they started a war in Congo. The war itself was brief, bloody, and surprisingly multilateral. Each militia quickly began operating in the interest of establishing not political dominance, but ethnic dominance. The ethnic cleansing experienced in the conflict was exacerbated by foreign intervention which sought to patronize one of the groups rather than mediate the conflict.

Unsurprisingly, there was little in the way of governance developed over the war’s months.[[107]](#footnote-107) Indeed, the politicians at the head of the militias provided scant recompense save for a narrative of grievance. The most notable governance development during the conflict was the chaos the militias caused from a law enforcement perspective.[[108]](#footnote-108) It is noteworthy, though, that the parties were able to use the extant political structures which remained to negotiate an end to the conflict. While not necessarily indicative of rebel governance, it is nevertheless impressive that parliamentarians and military officers from different sides of the conflict helped to secure a cease fire, even in the wake of an especially brutal neighborhood bombardment.[[109]](#footnote-109) It is also noteworthy that the efforts of Congolese actors succeeded where foreign mediation had failed.[[110]](#footnote-110)

**Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1997)**

Rebels / Incumbents: PCT militias led by Denis Sassou Nguesso / UPADS militias led by Pascal Lissouba

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Nguesso, who had been president of Congo from 1979 until Lissouba took over in 1992, returned from self-imposed exile in 1997 to declare a return to electoral politics.[[111]](#footnote-111) This also signaled a return to militia warfare, though, and his Cobra militia began fighting in the capital of Brazzaville in May of 1997. Had it not been for the support of Angolan soldiers in October of the same year, Nguesso would have been defeated. As it was, he assumed the presidency again that same month.

 Nguesso’s seizure of the presidency did not come by way of electoral prowess—indeed, he suspended Congo’s democracy upon the military defeat of his adversaries and has yet to fully resuscitate it.[[112]](#footnote-112) Nguesso’s political activity during the conflict was secondary to his military activity—although he campaigned briefly, following the arrest of some of his associates in May, he was determined to take Brazzaville by force of arms.[[113]](#footnote-113) In the absence of successful mediation, his campaign was successful. Although he resuscitated his flagging PCT party, the only developments on his part were military—Nguesso was only a ruler once he was no longer a rebel.

 Interestingly, Nguesso’s Cobras used a form of control even more punitive than the previous conflict had seen. In the war’s first manifestation, ethnic cleansing was enforced by the use of roadblocks, with militia fighters checking identification papers to ensure that the “wrong” ethnicities did not have access to the neighborhoods they controlled. The Cobras used the roadblocks to identify and victimize anyone who they perceived as benefiting from the democratic system.[[114]](#footnote-114)

 Traditional sources of order were not terribly effective either.[[115]](#footnote-115) In the wake of the conflict’s first chapter, militia fighters in need of a paycheck were recruited into the army and police forces. That these organs contributed to the banditry and general chaos of the conflict is not a surprise given this fact.

**Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (1998-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Southern militias (Ninjas, Cocoyes, Nstiloulous) / Congo (Nguesso), Cobra militia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The post-ascension peace was short-lived in Congo, as conflict renewed away from the capital less than a year after Nguesso took power.[[116]](#footnote-116) Even with the aid of Angolan troops, the fighting eventually reached Brazzaville. Ultimately, Nguesso was forced to negotiate with the rebels, offering amnesty to all rebel commanders save Lissouba and Kolelas (who were political rivals from Congo’s brief democratic era).

 This conflict, in spite of taking place largely outside of the capital, was even more brutal than its direct predecessor.[[117]](#footnote-117) One reason for the extraordinary brutality was the support from Congo-Brazzaville’s oil extraction sector.[[118]](#footnote-118) Nguesso retained his European contacts from his lengthy pre-democratic rule, meaning his leadership had lucrative implications for Elf Congo (an exploration and extraction firm). Fittingly, it was economic factors which ended the war. As the economy for many Congolese never recovered from the first conflict, the promise of employment was sufficient to coax militias to stop fighting (for the moment).[[119]](#footnote-119)

**Congo Republic (Brazzaville) (2002-2003)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Southern militias (Nstiloulous, Ninjas) / Congo

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 In spite of 1999’s agreement, the conflict had one final chapter. All told, though, this one is not terribly noteworthy. In spite of its temporal proximity to the 2002 elections, Patrice Yengo remarks with palpable weariness that the conflict itself brought with it new versions of the elements found in previous conflicts: “new military campaign, new peace agreement signed 17 March 2003, new violations.”[[120]](#footnote-120) The conflict’s lack of noteworthiness extends to the degree of violence—there is reason to believe that it does not cross the fatality threshold.[[121]](#footnote-121)

There is not even evidence that the militias actually held territory in this brief chapter of the conflict. However, it is worth noting that the peace agreement hints at Congo’s fragility—the insurgency in the Pool Department continued for years afterward in spite of the peace agreement.[[122]](#footnote-122) The rebels did not appear to have been able to hold territory at any time during the conflict, though.

**Croatia (1991-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) / Croatia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

After asserting its independence as Yugoslavia began to implode, Croatia faced the possibility that it may face secession within its own territory just as it seceded. Shortly after making its presence known by way of declaration, the RSK did so by attempting to eliminate or drive out Croats and Croatian administration.[[123]](#footnote-123) Thus, in addition to threats to Bosnian Croats, Croatia had to deal with internal conflict as well.

 The RSK was not especially well-equipped to provide services in its controlled territory.[[124]](#footnote-124) One reason for this was its emphasis on eliminating any vestige of Croatian-ness from its territory. This included the native Croats as well as any vestige of the fledgling Croatian state. Thus, not only was the capacity of the would-be state hamstrung, but its resources (especially its “police force”) were dedicated to projects not related to governance.

 The RSK took pains to appear representative, arranging an independence referendum shortly before the civil war began.[[125]](#footnote-125) In addition to this, the would-be state held elections over the course of its brief existence.[[126]](#footnote-126) As such, there was evidence of consultative instruments in the form of a representational apparatus emerging. However, this was one which institutionally barred non-Serbs from participation. Moreover, Serbian leadership (especially Slobodan Milosevic) was deeply involved in RSK’s process of selecting leadership,[[127]](#footnote-127) so the consultative instruments were not reflective of the will of RSK’s population, even if one only counts the Serbian population among that number.

**Croatia (1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) / Croatia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Croatia, having established its de facto independence in the wake of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, set out to consolidate its declared territory by conquering the Republic of Serbian Krajina’s territory in Eastern Slavonia.[[128]](#footnote-128) While the August offensives (Operations Flash and Storm) recaptured much of this territory within the month’s first week, the conflict was not formally ended until the year’s end. With December 1995’s signing of the Basic Agreement, an orderly transition to de jure control over Eastern Slavonia to match the de facto control enjoyed by Croatia was given the force of law.[[129]](#footnote-129)

 The RSK was intended to be a semi-autonomous satellite of Serbia, but it did provide some measure of consultative instruments for its ethnically defined population.[[130]](#footnote-130) Indeed, the RSK held elections a month before the conflict began, which led to the ascendance of a new Prime Minister.[[131]](#footnote-131) The impact of this development is somewhat limited, though—by the end of August, most of RSK’s political leadership had fled abroad in the wake of losing its territory. It was further hamstrung by the fact that Belgrade was deeply involved in the selection of RSK’s leadership.[[132]](#footnote-132)

 Other manifestations of governance are wanting here, though. The police force was, for all intents and purposes, a paramilitary organization designed to achieve the fledgling would-be state’s goals of ethnic cleansing and to enrich itself by way of criminal enterprise.[[133]](#footnote-133) In spite of controlling substantial territory within the country, the RSK appears to have actively disrupted the function of public good provision.[[134]](#footnote-134)

**Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) (1996-1997)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) / Mobutist Zaire

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The first war in the DRC was one in which disparate elements aligned against Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime sought to replace the authoritarian regime.[[135]](#footnote-135) With substantial aid from foreign patrons (especially Rwanda), Mobutu’s Zaire was toppled and Laurent Kabila was installed as his replacement. In part because of the war’s brevity, the AFDL had been marginally (at best) successful in establishing some modicum of governance during the conflict.

 To some extent, AFDL governance was a victim of their good fortune—their victory was too rapid to allow for carefully planned governance structures.[[136]](#footnote-136) It is perhaps unsurprising then, that the AFDL’s program of political education was extremely hastily produced, churning out ideologically literate supporters as fast as they can.[[137]](#footnote-137) Beyond this, though, the AFDL appears to not have been overly concerned with providing education (or healthcare, for that matter).

 The group did arrange for referenda to be conducted, but the purpose was not to represent popular interests in lawmaking.[[138]](#footnote-138) The reason for these was to identify corrupt officials and remove them from their posts. This could be done with little political cost as most officials had no ties to the AFDL by design. The downside to this arrangement, though, is that the group had little institutional competency outside of the military.

Any praise for success must be further tempered by the fact that the AFDL committed scores of human rights violations on their way to victory, though.[[139]](#footnote-139) Aside from attacks on refugees, it is also clear that the policing and juridical functions that the AFDL pursued had more to do with quashing dissent than enforcing the rule of law.[[140]](#footnote-140) While the war’s brevity may have precluded the possibility of good governance, it appears that the AFDL was also not entirely committed to the project in the first place.

**Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) (1998-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) (Later RCD-Goma, others), The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) / Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The second war in DRC saw the ascendant rebels from the previous conflict playing the part of the incumbents. Similarly, the role of the AFDL was taken up by the RCD. RCD governance strategy is one which should strike observers as familiar—indeed, their AFDL predecessors used one quite similar.[[141]](#footnote-141) Instead of building institutions from scratch, the RCD attempted to coopt what little state competency remained in controlled territory. Even where this was found wanting, the RCD tried to invigorate atrophied institutions to at least produce the illusion that they, like their predecessors, were a “government in waiting.”

 Unfortunately, RCD ambitions were more impressive than the outcomes the group was able to produce. Their cadres were undisciplined and several human rights violations were committed against their subject populations. In spite of this, the RCD appeared to play a role in creating a multi-ethnic conflict resolution organ: the Council of Elders.[[142]](#footnote-142) The group’s efforts at establishing policing and judicial functions seems to be more as a means of collecting revenue than establishing law and order, though. Indeed, they considered security to be a “private matter,” which can help explain the profound insecurity experienced during the conflict among the civilian population.[[143]](#footnote-143)

 The group (and later its factions) appeared to be interested in establishing public good provision at the war’s outset.[[144]](#footnote-144) This enthusiasm evaporated quickly, though. In spite of RCD’s efforts to produce the trappings of a state (ministries, stationary, etc.), its efforts at providing goods themselves were barely extant.[[145]](#footnote-145) The extent of their support for education amounts to not getting in the way of civil society actors’ provision of the good. Healthcare, such as it was, came entirely from NGO’s—even during the peace between the two conflicts.[[146]](#footnote-146) Similarly, in spite of numerous claims from the group itself to the contrary, there was little concrete evidence that attempts to establish anything like a rule of law—or even cadre discipline—by any manifestation of the RCD and its constituent, splinter, and rival groups bore fruit.[[147]](#footnote-147)

 The RCD’s struggles were mirrored by those of the MLC, who like the RCD were supported from abroad but maintained ambitions of ruling the state.[[148]](#footnote-148) Also like the RCD, their ambitions outstripped their results. They were a popular group, however, and in spite of Ugandan support,[[149]](#footnote-149) were as successful at collecting revenues and taking advantage of the natural resources in their controlled territories as the RCD.[[150]](#footnote-150) This was the extent of their successes, however. The lack of accountability measures meant that the group’s forces abused civilians with impunity.

One could argue that the group was more successful than the RCD in producing consultative instruments, but those of the MLC had roughly the same impact. Taken as a whole, it is more accurate to describe the conflict as lacking them. The group’s founder, Jean-Pierre Bemba saw to it that his version of a “government in waiting” was staffed by people from each of DRC’s districts, but this is the extent of these measures.[[151]](#footnote-151) This did not stop the Kabila government from coopting them in the Lusaka Accords, but the point stands.

**Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) (2001-2003)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RCD-Goma, MLC / DRC

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The peace at the end of the second chapter of the civil war was short-lived. By 2001, the Lusaka agreement was shattered by the assassination of President Joseph Kabila (who was replaced by his son). Although the conflict’s final chapter was mercifully brief, it nevertheless left DRC’s already desperate population in truly dire straits.[[152]](#footnote-152)

 The third and final chapter of DRC’s civil war proceeded much like the second from a governance standpoint.[[153]](#footnote-153) Independent (and predominantly religious) civil society actors provided most of what little education there was to be had in DRC (and the state complimented these efforts with its own, although they were less effective). Healthcare provision was similarly provided by independent actors, although in this case by NGO’s. Although the group took pains to mobilize popular support, it does not appear that the group succeeded in establishing consultative instruments.

 The one place where governance appeared seems to have been almost incidental.[[154]](#footnote-154) The courts that RCD-G ran were, for the most part, used as a source of revenue and a convenient means of disposing of opposition, but their operation bears noting. Much like the state that came before, though, the operation of institutional trappings of law enforcement signified nothing as far as law and order were concerned.[[155]](#footnote-155) Even if one argues that the courts operated as intended, the population did not view them as a source of order.[[156]](#footnote-156)

 In spite of having been brought into the government at the end of the conflict’s second chapter, the MLC was also at war with Kabila’s government.[[157]](#footnote-157) While some saw the group as one which could have a positive impact on the country before this stage,[[158]](#footnote-158) the group’s activities during this stage were viewed in a much less positive light.[[159]](#footnote-159) The lack of accountability manifested itself in notorious atrocities committed by MLC forces.[[160]](#footnote-160) The most infamous of these became known as Effacer le Tableau (“Erase the Blackboard”), a campaign by MLC and RCD splinter groups to brutalize and exterminate the pygmy population.[[161]](#footnote-161)

 The one instance of genuine rebel governance appears to be RCD-Goma’s institution of a Provincial Assembly.[[162]](#footnote-162) While the impact of this organ is limited, its stated aim—to serve as a check on executive power in the Kivus—appears to have been met. For instance, the Pole Institute noted that the assembly debated the North Kivu governor’s proposed budget, ultimately voting for it to be adopted.[[163]](#footnote-163)

**Djibouti (1991-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) / Djibouti

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The civil war in Djibouti was waged between the predominantly Afar FRUD (itself a coalition of other dissident groups) and President Hassan Gouled Aptidon’s authoritarian regime in Djibouti.[[164]](#footnote-164) Discontent at the president’s powers and what Afars perceived as an institutionalized and systematic preference for Issa over Afar were sufficient to constitute a raison de guerre, but as the Front’s name suggests, FRUD was also dedicated to producing a democracy—either by overthrowing the current government or by forcing Gouled to consent to such. Unfortunately, FRUD did little to administer the territories which it controlled.

 FRUD’s leadership had not planned on serving as rulers—at least not until the government was toppled, anyway.[[165]](#footnote-165) It was only after the group had made substantial territorial gains that the group’s military leaders even broached the subject. While the group transitioned into a political party after the conflict ended, there is little evidence that any effort was made to begin to administer their territory. Worse, the transition from military force to political party did not lead to Djiboutians enjoying the goods of good governance after the conflict, either. For example, education provision is particularly pitiful—but by no means unique.[[166]](#footnote-166)

**El Salvador (1979-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: FMLN/Salvadoran Government

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 2**

See Case Study Chapter

**Ethiopia (1974-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) / The Derg

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 2**

Two ofEthiopia’s concomitant civil wars began with the ousting (and eventual coup d’état) of Emperor Haile Selassie by the emergent Derg, even as their causes exist independent of this cataclysm. In this case, the cause was Eritrean Independence—something which Ethiopia’s new rulers were in no mood to entertain. Although Selassie had also taken steps to undermine Eritrean autonomy, it was clear that the “confederal” relationship that had existed from 1950 into the 1960’s was not to be had under the Derg.[[167]](#footnote-167)

 The EPLF was not the only Eritrean group fighting the Derg; indeed, it was not even the first. The Eritrean Liberation Front differed dramatically from its similarly named counterpart in ideology: the ELF was conservative and Islamic; the latter was Marxist-Leninist and uninterested in religion.[[168]](#footnote-168) By 1980, the EPLF was, for all intents and purposes, uncontested in its claim to represent Eritrean independence as an interest.[[169]](#footnote-169)

 In spite of a lack of outside inputs, the EPLF was generally successful in its aim to provide public goods.[[170]](#footnote-170) Their success on the front of healthcare was especially noteworthy given the lack of resources, but substantial gains were made regardless. The EPLF dispatched workers to remote locations to help treat maladies, but their primary aim was educational—they taught midwives as well as preventative and curative medicine in remote villages. In a country where substantial portions of the population may not have access to hospitals, this was a major landmark.

 The EPLF was also deeply invested in the project of popular education, and aimed to provide it for as large a portion of its controlled territory as possible.[[171]](#footnote-171) This manifested itself in the provision of primary education for Eritreans,[[172]](#footnote-172) but it was not limited thereto. The group invested substantial resources into doctrinal education as well.[[173]](#footnote-173) In order to ensure that the population understood and accepted their political agenda, they trained scores of political organizers at cadre schools.

It is perhaps unsurprising given how EPLF education manifested itself, but the rebel group relied heavily on its supporters, even as it demanded complete and absolute obedience to their cause.[[174]](#footnote-174) On one hand, there was a great deal of interactivity between the average Eritrean and their wartime government, such as it was, including regular village elections.[[175]](#footnote-175) The degree to which the EPLF stressed popular democracy[[176]](#footnote-176) contrasts with the way in which dissent was treated. Considering themselves to be the Eritreans’ vanguard, the EPLF dealt with dissent in any and all forms quickly and brutally.[[177]](#footnote-177)

The elections themselves were arranged around local organizations known as *baitos*.[[178]](#footnote-178) These organizations also served as the point where the EPLF interacted with the population of its controlled territory. This included the enforcement of EPLF law. Administrators—who themselves were accountable to both party and populace—could adjudicate disputes and assign punishments in a similar way as a judge might.

**Ethiopia (1974-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) / The Derg

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 2**

The TPLF was born of anti-Derg sentiment in 1974. While initially of little concern, it emerged as both a potent fighting force and as effective governors as the war progressed.[[179]](#footnote-179) The TPLF was never as ideologically homogenous as its EPLF counterparts, but a philosophy of cooperative engagement informed the group’s activities as rebel rulers.[[180]](#footnote-180)

 The primary means of delivering the goods of governance were local organizations known as *baitos*. These organizations helped to provide a level of domestic security—no mean feat given the Derg campaigns in Tigray.[[181]](#footnote-181) The localized organs served as a mechanism for confronting grievances as well as adjudicating cases within TPLF controlled territory.

The TPLF was largely successful in providing public goods. Like the EPLF, they took pains to teach the rural population their ideology.[[182]](#footnote-182) Indeed, formal education of children would take a backseat to political education or training when material shortages forced baito members to choose between the two, even as both were provided for absent resource shortages.[[183]](#footnote-183) Similarly, the TPLF was successful in providing healthcare in its controlled territory.[[184]](#footnote-184) Just as with the rest of TPLF governance outputs, healthcare was administered from the local baitos.[[185]](#footnote-185)

Like the EPLF, the TPLF emphasized popular democracy at the village level, employing locally elected councils in the baitos.[[186]](#footnote-186) These councils produced policies that held sway within the localities, even as they differed from village to village. As can be gathered from this fact (and unlike the EPLF), the TPLF appeared to be somewhat tolerant of a degree of ideological dissent.

**Ethiopia (1977-1985)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) / The Derg

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Unlike its two more successful counterparts in Eritrea and Tigray, the Western Somali Liberation Front relied extensively on the intervention of foreign patrons. Once these Somali patrons had been routed in 1978, the group ceased to be a going concern.[[187]](#footnote-187) Although it lingered on in one form or another until 1985, the WSLF (and its splinter groups) posed little threat to the incumbent Derg after their 1978 defeat. The reason for this was the group’s ties and reliance upon their patron, the Somali state. Once defeated in the field, both rebels and patron suffered a rapid slide to obscurity and an agonizingly slow death.[[188]](#footnote-188)

 Although better organized and more popular than their ideological cousins, the Somali-Abo Liberation Fron (SALF), neither group had anything more than the appearance of autonomy from their Somali patrons.[[189]](#footnote-189) Both in terms of their materiel and their organization, the two rebel groups were utterly dependent upon Somalia. In part because of this, the group’s part to play in the larger Ethiopian conflict was largely as a guerilla nuisance, lingering on just long enough after Somalia’s defeat to merit a concerted (and ultimately successful) campaign to snuff them out in 1985.[[190]](#footnote-190) Other than attempts to undermine Derg administration, these groups did not interact with issues of governance.

**Georgia – Abkhazia (1992-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia / Georgia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Abkhazia’s war to secure its independence from Georgia began in response to the restoration of Georgia’s 1921 constitution (which stripped the region of its autonomy).[[191]](#footnote-191) Abkhazia was able to secure a cease-fire with the state in late 1993 and end the war entirely by the following spring, consolidating its military victory in the process. Interestingly, in spite of its de facto control of the its eponymous territory, it remains de jure a part of Georgia.

 Abkhazia’s military victory obscures the fact that the would-be state did not establish control over its territory even afterward. For instance, Emzar Kvitsiani maintained a Svan enclave during and after the conflict in the Kodori Gorge region.[[192]](#footnote-192) Even within its controlled territory, though, little in the way of infrastructure survived the conflict—what institutions and competencies exist in Abkhazia have, for the most part, been developed in the time since the war’s end.[[193]](#footnote-193) For instance, the Republic of Abkhazia has made some strides in rebuilding its educational infrastructure, but these strides took place after the war.[[194]](#footnote-194) During the war, most educational facilities in the would-be state were destroyed.

 Although consultative instruments existed in the form of an Abkhazian parliament (in which the different ethnic groups were guaranteed a certain number of seats), wartime developments of this parliament were scarce. Its formation preceded the beginning of the conflict and its ratification of the fledgling proto-state’s constitution came after the war’s end—each by a matter of months.[[195]](#footnote-195) In addition to the relative lack of developments during the war, the would-be state’s parliament is institutionally weak, with little ability to check the postwar-created presidency’s allotted powers.[[196]](#footnote-196) This is somewhat remarkable given that the rebels’ commandeering of the pre-extant parliament accompanied the acquisition of other state functions, including the police force. However, this police force was immediately pressed into service as soldiers, with the war itself beginning with Abkhaz police officers attacking Georgian forces.[[197]](#footnote-197) As such, the rebels are not coded as providing policing or juridical functions.

**Georgia – South Ossetia (1991-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Republic of South Ossetia / Georgia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The secessionist conflict in South Ossetia began just as the Soviet Union collapsed, but tensions between Georgia and the former Oblast had been rising for some time. When Georgia declared its independence, it also revoked South Ossetia’s status as being an autonomous oblast.[[198]](#footnote-198) This appears to have been the raison de guerre.

 The appearance of consultative instruments took place just prior to the war, with the newly formed South Ossetian Parliament coming into being nearly concomitantly with the war’s initiation.[[199]](#footnote-199) While this still technically falls outside the bounds of the war itself, the decision of that parliament to adopt a declaration of independence as its founding document weeks before the war’s conclusion counts as a substantial wartime development. In spite of this (and the development of three distinct political parties), South Ossetian civil society struggled to develop under conditions of near-anarchy.[[200]](#footnote-200) However, a referendum was held in January of 1992 to determine whether South Ossetia should join Russia. South Ossetians voted overwhelmingly to leave Georgia (Georgians did not participate in the referendum).[[201]](#footnote-201) Another such referendum was held in the months following the cessation of the conflict, and South Ossetia has maintained de facto independence since.[[202]](#footnote-202)

 Other forms of governance have been a bit scarcer. There was only enough time to organize paramilitary fighters during the conflict, and South Ossetia has continued to lack effective, formal law enforcement organs. Several attempts have been made by foreign groups to produce law and order within the region, with dispiriting results.[[203]](#footnote-203) President Saakashvili attempted to use the provision of healthcare as an olive branch some ten years after the conflict’s ending, but provision before then appears to have been quite poor. Even outside of the breakaway republics, Georgian healthcare provision was in the midst of collapse.[[204]](#footnote-204) Moreover, in spite of the existence of nominally independent representative organs, education in South Ossetia was allowed to decay over the course of the conflict, reflecting the state of South Ossetian medical care.[[205]](#footnote-205)

**Guatemala (1963-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Several; Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP), Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), Guatemalan Party of Labor (PGT), united as Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) since 1982 / Paramilitary groups, Guatemala

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The Guatemalan civil war began as rebel groups composed of reformist military personnel and land-poor Guatemalans (many of whom were victims of land grabs by wealthier individuals) took up arms against the state’s military government.[[206]](#footnote-206) The various rebel movements were hamstrung by their own lack of coordination and the willingness of the military establishment to employ extraordinary brutality in its counterinsurgent efforts. While the rebel groups united in 1982 to form the URNG, Guatemala’s rebels were on the ropes from this point until the war’s conclusion. Although they regrouped by the end of the decade, Guatemala’s military (and military-aligned militias) were better equipped and organized than the guerillas, placing them at a distinct disadvantage.[[207]](#footnote-207) Even had URNG adopted a strategy of taking and holding territory, they would likely have been unsuccessful.

 In spite of the rebels’ reliance on sympathetic civilians for food, the URNG (and its constituent groups) did not adopt a strategy of holding territory, in part due to its strategic disadvantages, particularly later in the conflict.[[208]](#footnote-208) This made rebel governance especially difficult. It did not help matters that URNG was a coalition. Although the group took pains to enumerate something like a unified political agenda, the disparate ideologies which composed it made this difficult.[[209]](#footnote-209) This was also reflected in the lack of success the group had in leveraging its newfound solvency in the 1990’s, as they failed to secure a place in the postwar order beyond legalization as a political party.[[210]](#footnote-210) The group was further hamstrung by an apparent lack of sophistication, causing it to lean heavily upon moderators in the negotiations themselves.[[211]](#footnote-211)

 Ironically, before they coalesced into a single group, the rebels were more successful at controlling (and sometimes administering[[212]](#footnote-212)) territory. For instance, MR-13 had little difficulty operating among and between far-flung villages in the mid-1960s. During this period, the group was able to organize political and military leadership from among its peasant-recruited numbers.[[213]](#footnote-213) Additionally, peasant committees were established during this early period. These popularly elected committees handled disputes among peasants and aided in political organizing.[[214]](#footnote-214) Once guerilla operations moved toward urban population centers, though, the Guatemalan government was able to deal the rebels serious defeats. By 1971, Guatemala’s guerilla activity had all but ceased.[[215]](#footnote-215)

 The late 1970s saw the re-energized insurgent groups operating over the majority of the country (18 of 22 departments) and controlling a substantial portion of this territory.[[216]](#footnote-216) One reason for this success was the effort to incorporate the indigenous Mayan population which had been politically neglected up to this point by both government and insurgents.[[217]](#footnote-217) This allowed the group to introduce some organizational elements to their controlled territories.[[218]](#footnote-218) Although the particular arrangement of the institutions is unknown, it appears that institutions similar in function to the peasant committees of the 1960s emerged in some regions.[[219]](#footnote-219)

 Until 1982, insurgents were able to ramp up activities, particularly their means to extract funds. They kidnapped foreigners to hold for ransom and collected “revolutionary taxes” (which essentially constituted a protection racket).[[220]](#footnote-220) Thanks to a profoundly brutal counterinsurgency campaign concomitant with an aggressive campaign of development to undermine the rebels’ legitimacy, government forces made substantial gains.[[221]](#footnote-221) It came at enormous human costs, even aside from battlefield casualties—anyone exhibiting anything less than enthusiastic endorsement of the military’s ends and means was a target for assassination.[[222]](#footnote-222)

**Guinea-Bissau (1998)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Ansumane Mane and allied portion of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces / Guinea-Bissau

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Ansumane Mane, on the verge of being implicated in a scandal related to the sale of arms to Senegal, organized sympathetic elements of the armed forces to attempt a coup d’état.[[223]](#footnote-223) Between the somewhat dubious accusations leveled against him and public dissatisfaction with governmental corruption and a generally low standard of living, Mane had little trouble attracting followers. The coup quickly became a war, as the brief war became extraordinarily bloody.

 Mane retained a substantial portion of power after the peace agreement was signed. Nevertheless, the promised elections were held on schedule.[[224]](#footnote-224) However, very little took place during the fighting other than the fighting itself.[[225]](#footnote-225) Mane, a military commander himself, busied himself with the business of the war, trusting that the postwar process would revitalize the democratic institutions that already existed. Other than the organizing of the belligerents, no rebel governance manifested itself during this brief conflict.

**India (1984-1993)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Khalistan Separatists / India

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Although the civil war had technically begun already, Operation Bluestar marked the largest confrontation between Sikh separatists aiming at establishing an independent Khalistan and Indian forces.[[226]](#footnote-226) Although the operation successfully ejected the separatist militants from their fortified position inside Marmandir Sahib, the operation also left Punjab’s Sikhs deeply alienated, in no small part due to the places symbolism in India’s founding.[[227]](#footnote-227) This alienation likely played a role in the assassination of Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards. Ghandi’s popularity outside of Punjab then fueled brutal reprisals in the form of deadly riots.

 Although the separatists were rumored to have established their own civil administration within their pockets of controlled territory,[[228]](#footnote-228) instruments of limited Sikh autonomy already existed at the time of the conflict’s beginning.[[229]](#footnote-229) Indeed, elections to the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC)—an organ which handles religious questions and administers Sikh places of worship—are (and were) conducted by the state. However, over the course of the conflict, some extra-state institutions emerged. For instance, the independent Panthic Committee was created by militants in 1986. However, this and other institutional actions (disbanding the SGPC, appointing a jathedar outside of SGPC auspices) were themselves subversions of elected Sikh officials. Regardless of their popularity, these actions do not qualify as additional consultative instruments.

 This appears to be the extent of Khalistani institutional development, as the groups pushing for independence suffered a myriad of obstacles. In spite of assistance from mass organizations in Punjab beginning before the conflict,[[230]](#footnote-230) Khalistan separatism became increasingly unpopular as allegations of rape and murder on the part of militants spread throughout the state. Inconsistent support from Pakistan also made consolidation difficult, as it meant that the material disadvantage suffered by the militants was unlikely to be remedied. Thirdly, beginning in 1988, factional rivalries left the movement deeply divided, preventing the consolidation of their meagre resources.[[231]](#footnote-231) Finally, the Indian government instituted a brutal campaign to stamp out militancy in Punjab, overwhelming what remained of militant forces.[[232]](#footnote-232)

**Indonesia (1975-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor Leste (Fretilin, or as their armed win is referred, Falintil) and National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) / Indonesia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

 East Timor (or Timor Leste) emerged from Portuguese colonialism into an even more dire circumstance with Indonesian occupation. Considering East Timor to be a part of Indonesia proper,[[233]](#footnote-233) Suharto’s Indonesia consistently employed extraordinary brutality in dealing with Timor Leste independence movements, regardless of their own violence.[[234]](#footnote-234) In the face of genocidal violence[[235]](#footnote-235) by the incumbents,[[236]](#footnote-236) East Timor’s rebels were able to make extremely limited progress in the realm of rebel governance.

 Fretilin took advantage of the mountainous territory away from the would-be state’s coast as a base of operations.[[237]](#footnote-237) In spite of this, their ambitious governance agenda, formed before the conflict began,[[238]](#footnote-238) pressed forward. From their isolated enclaves, they attempted to establish programs of education and literacy. Unfortunately, the majority of the population remained in Indonesian controlled territory, which was itself subject to a substantial education program aimed at socializing new generations of complacent Indonesian citizens.[[239]](#footnote-239) Beyond these programs, though, there is little evidence of rebel governance as Fretilin clung to life for the first decade of the conflict.

 Beginning in the late 1980’s and continuing until the conflict’s close in 1999, other groups (including the CNRT and the increasingly independent Falintil) began to more directly and actively participate in the effort to secure Timorese independence.[[240]](#footnote-240) Interestingly, this coincided with the development of a more concrete system of parallel governance in East Timor. This “Clandestine System” supported resistance fighters and aided communication within the movement.[[241]](#footnote-241) More importantly, this parallel system of governance was meant to recruit support among the population with the aid of leaders selected from among their number *by* their number (even though not by way of formal elections). [[242]](#footnote-242)

**Indonesia (1990-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Concomitantly with the then ongoing conflict in East Timor, separatists in the Free Aceh Movement were engaged in a struggle to liberate their small, eponymous corner of Sumatra.[[243]](#footnote-243) Although the movement originated in the 1970’s, emerging from some elements which had survived the Darul Islam rebellion, its impact was marginal for quite some time. Indonesia authorities had effectively eliminated GAM’s presence from the country in 1979, devoting counter-insurgency resources in spite of its still marginal size. By 1989, though, the movement had recovered, sporting hundreds of foreign-trained fighters in the place of the marginal presence it had previously. This led to the Jaring Mereh operation—“Red Net” in English.

 The movement had established something of a government shortly after its formation.[[244]](#footnote-244) However, this existed more in theory than in practice; beyond a promise of popular choice of regime, there was nothing resembling a feedback mechanism in place here, even as the movement relied heavily upon popular support. The impact of Aceh governance is further diminished by the brutality and completeness of its defeat in 1991—although many elements of the movement were able to flee into exile, its active presence in Aceh was effectively ended (for a time).[[245]](#footnote-245)

**Indonesia (1999-2002)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

 The Free Aceh Movement spotted an opportunity to reconstitute itself after Suharto’s departure from power. This second chapter also saw more opportunities to develop manifestations of rebel governance. For instance, the movement was successful in establishing a parallel legal system.[[246]](#footnote-246) Still, in spite of the appearance of institutions suggesting as much, law and order was not forthcoming. Neither Indonesian nor GAM forces were terribly well-disciplined and human rights abuses were common. Moreover, the “law” in law and order was subject to substantial variance—because of the latitude GAM gave to its commanders, some areas were subject to morality policing in the Islamist mold.[[247]](#footnote-247) Others were not, though, as the particular role of Islam in GAM was open to a great deal of interpretation.[[248]](#footnote-248)

 Public goods are another matter. Public good provision on behalf of the state continued in GAM-controlled territory,[[249]](#footnote-249) it did not do so without interruption.[[250]](#footnote-250) Dozens of teachers were killed between 1998 and 2002, and hundreds more assaulted. Indonesian security forces are to blame for a substantial portion of these, but so are the GAM—they believe that the state education system has been an important tool of marginalizing the Aceh people’s uniqueness. Kirsten Schulze suspects that the GAM may have been motivated by the fact that many of the alternatives to state education were GAM-controlled. As such, even though the GAM was participating in destroying the state’s capacity to provide public goods, they were also engaged in the practice—at least where education was concerned.

 Health care is more difficult to discern. On one hand, Mampilly notes that GAM was content to allow the extant health care structure to operate.[[251]](#footnote-251) On the other, Damien Kingsbury notes that in addition to most of the education in the region, GAM had taken on a majority of the region’s health care responsibilities.[[252]](#footnote-252) These statements, taken together are somewhat problematic. They are further clouded by the fact that as a political party after the war, the movement called for free education and health care as major planks of its platform.[[253]](#footnote-253) This leads one to a few conclusions. First, it seems that GAM did administer public good provision to some degree, even if this administration involved some degree of cooption.[[254]](#footnote-254) This is clearer for education than for healthcare, but the point stands. Second, they did not administer the sum total of public good provision within Aceh, in spite of their dominance of the region.[[255]](#footnote-255) This means that the Indonesian government maintained some control over its provision. At the same time, the destruction of facilities and calls from the Aceh Party (PA) to establish greater access to public services suggests that their provision was not as robust as it might be, a conclusion supported by government-reported statistics.[[256]](#footnote-256)

 The presence of consultative instruments within GAM is also somewhat contested. After the demise of Suharto’s New Order Government, GAM instituted traditional governance structures.[[257]](#footnote-257) These structures privileged local input and included an elected eight member council of elders for each village. This suggests that these consultative instruments were quite strong. In practice, however, the positions on the council were often passed down hereditarily.

**Indonesia (2003-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Free Aceh Movement / Indonesia

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

The final chapter saw a natural disaster and the abandonment of independence as an ultimate aim, but little in the way of new rebel governance outcomes. Policing and juridical saw some development, albeit largely in the form of acceptance by the population. The courts had gained considerable legitimacy in the eyes of the Acehnese people by this final stage of the conflict.[[258]](#footnote-258) This was in part due to the fact that rebel-run courts were more likely to be functional at the time, but the point stands;[[259]](#footnote-259) with the help of religious leaders, GAM was able to provide an approximation of a judiciary during this final chapter of the armed conflict.[[260]](#footnote-260)

 Where public goods are concerned, the calls for health care and education suggested that provision was far from perfect.[[261]](#footnote-261) However, in this final chapter, the relationships between the GAM and local religious leaders bore substantial fruit in this realm. While originally skeptical of their independence project (or at the very least skeptical that they should become involved), their cooperation aided GAM’s governance project, both in terms of shoring up its legitimacy with local populations and in terms of supporting their efficacy. Although this contributed to the operation of the courts, this was clearest in the case of religious schools from this time period, which relied heavily on the resources of local ulama.[[262]](#footnote-262)

 In spite of GAM’s developments as a political actor, some observers remained skeptical of their efficacy as such an actor, even after the conflict ended.[[263]](#footnote-263) This did not stop them from trying during the conflict, however. Although their capabilities were hamstrung by Indonesian military successes and the capture of civilian leaders, GAM attempted to consolidate their status as competent and legitimate civilian leaders.[[264]](#footnote-264) Much of it had collapsed by the time the tsunami hit, though, leaving the movement without much of its local civilian political capital.

**Iran (1979-1984)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdish Separatists / Islamic Republic of Iran

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Iran’s Kurds had been vocal proponents of removing the Shah during the Iranian Revolution. However, Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary ideology left little room for Kurdish autonomy.[[265]](#footnote-265) While Kurdish community in Iran was riven with ideological fault lines, those who wished for autonomy took umbrage at Khomeini’s assertion that the (specifically Shi’ite) Muslim identity of Iranians would transcend all other signifiers in the new regime. Not only were most Iranian Kurds Sunni, but many (especially Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini) believed Iran’s budding theocracy to be a substantial threat to the Kurds’ cultural and ethnic separateness.

 In the wake of the revolution (and perhaps anticipating issues with the ascendant revolutionary government), Iran’s Kurds began asserting their autonomy, holding local elections and reviving old political organizations.[[266]](#footnote-266) This political activity was not restricted to extra-state manifestations, though—although many Kurds participated in the boycott of the Islamic Republic referendum, Kurdish candidates stood for election in the resultant parliament.[[267]](#footnote-267) The degree of political organization among Kurdish officials (particularly the Kurdish Democratic Party) and its control of Iranian Kurdistan meant that the famously recalcitrant Islamic Republic negotiated with Kurdish leadership on occasion. This is particularly impressive given the number of different factions within Iran’s Kurdish community.

 This was hardly window-dressing—the KDP maintained a remarkable level of parallel administration until its territory was conquered in 1983.[[268]](#footnote-268) In addition to arranging local elections, KDP administration produced schools and hospitals for Iranian Kurdistan, as well as “a court of law with an experienced and professional judge.”[[269]](#footnote-269) Interestingly, the KDP was willing to exist as an autonomous region *within* Iran, in spite of this parallel administration (at least in the wake of the revolution).[[270]](#footnote-270) This mattered little in the end, though; independent Kurdistan was effectively liquidated in Iran by 1984.

**Iraq (1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Various Dissident Factions (South) and Kurdistan (North) / Iraq

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, fresh off being routed in Kuwait, faced an uprising beginning in March of 1991—although it may be more accurate to describe the civil war as consisting of two distinct uprisings. Southern towns, beginning with Basra, fell to a largely spontaneous and unorganized uprising of dissidents who noticed the flagging state power’s vulnerability.[[271]](#footnote-271) In spite of early successes, by late March the Ba’athists had regained control of its Southern territories, aided by the lack of any sort of organization to the uprising.

 The Kurdish involvement in the uprising was more organized than its southern counterpart, but the outcome was similar.[[272]](#footnote-272) Fueled by horrors of living in Saddam’s Iraq, Kurdish attacks on Iraqi state organs were brutal. Little in the way of new organs of governance replaced the smoldering ruins of the Ba’athist administration, though. As Kurdistan fell, much of the organizational capital that did exist was put to use organizing large-scale evacuations to avoid chemical weapons attacks.[[273]](#footnote-273)

In neither case was there substantial governance efforts on the part of the rebels. In spite of the state’s inability to meet the populations’ need of public goods in the wake of the war, the rebels generally failed to fill the gap with one exception.[[274]](#footnote-274) When one notes that the uprisings barely survived into April, this becomes easy to understand; the southern rebels hardly had time to be “stationary” bandits. With that said, Kurdish rebels had established a means by which they could take advantage of the not insignificant number of trained medical personnel.[[275]](#footnote-275)

**Ivory Coast (2002-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: New Forces (FN), Patriotic Movement of the Ivory Coast (MPCI) / Ivory Coast, government-aligned militias

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Ivory Coast’s civil war began as motive merged with opportunity for the largely Muslim northern region of the country. Amidst the chaos surrounding a power transition in the country and a failed coup the Forces Nouvelles (“New Forces” in English) quickly gained control of the northern, inland region of the West African state.[[276]](#footnote-276) Their raison de guerre appears to have been a policy of exclusion of the northern, largely Muslim population, brought on as ethnic tensions emerged in the wake of a struggling economy.[[277]](#footnote-277) In spite of the economic struggles that had gripped the country, the FN was successful in providing the goods of governance to the population in its controlled territory, especially after the creation of La Centrale in 2004, an organization which provided a comprehensive framework for administering FN territory.[[278]](#footnote-278)

 In addition to an elaborate apparatus of taxation and regulation, FN produced functioning policing and juridical functions in the northern regions of the state.[[279]](#footnote-279) Its functions had been coopted by acquisitive rebels by 2007, but these functions were nevertheless present over the course of the conflict. This is particularly the case in the wake of 2004’s reorganization, in which military, political, financial elements of the movement were given their own semi-autonomous wings. Even aside from cooption, the function of policing and juridical under FN was not perfect.[[280]](#footnote-280) Although they excelled at maintaining internal domestic security, they were far less successful performing adjudicative functions. Their attempts at doing so took a few forms, but ultimately adjudicative functions were ceded to civil society actors who established such functions under FN supervision.

Similarly, although schools and hospitals were already present in spite of the Ivorian state’s lack of reach in the country’s Northeast region, the FN did oversee the construction of additional education and healthcare facilities.[[281]](#footnote-281) This is important as many Ivorians had been resentful at the degree to which these projects relied on volunteer organizations.[[282]](#footnote-282) With that said, the availability of education and (especially) medicine was limited in rebel-controlled areas.[[283]](#footnote-283) This was especially disappointing to Ivorians who had seen the dispensation of medical treatment in the wake of rebel victories by said rebel medics.[[284]](#footnote-284)

 The FN struggled to engender lasting popular support for their movement in spite of these functions, though. Although in part due to the governance functions being coopted for the enrichment of rebels[[285]](#footnote-285) and the perception among the Lobi people that the FN was taxing them especially heavily, the ineffectuality of consultative instruments did not help matters. Indeed, the FN actively undermined what consultative instruments existed as a part of the previous regime.[[286]](#footnote-286) However, the FN did contain an organ intended to mobilize popular support and register discontent known as the Délégant General.[[287]](#footnote-287) Additionally, this organization was intended to make decisions regarding the dedication of resources to provide public goods (as well as coordinating relationships with NGOs for similar purposes). However, FN’s attempts at consultative instruments were not terribly successful. For instance, the function of public meetings to register dissent was diminished by the fact that even politicians felt intimidated into acquiescence.By conflict’s end, popular sentiment was strong enough that dissent against its rule was registered, but response to it was underwhelming; the FN did not begin ceding autonomy to local civil society actors until well after this chapter of the conflict had ended.[[288]](#footnote-288)

**Kosovo (1998-1999)**

Rebels: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) / Serbia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Displeased with the outcomes of the various civil wars that emerged from Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the KLA staged a brief insurgency at the end of the 1990’s.[[289]](#footnote-289) While some have argued that the KLA should have been treated as a terrorist organization,[[290]](#footnote-290) others point to the continued repression experienced by the non-Serbian population at the hands of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as reason enough for the KLA’s resort to violence. The KLA’s success rested to a large extent on its ability to convince others to intervene on its behalf, but it took pains to cultivate genuine popular support.

 In part due to Milosevic’s use of ethnic cleansing and recruitment of criminal elements to help contain the insurgency, the KLA had few opportunities to establish parallel governance structures.[[291]](#footnote-291) They did try to leverage their continued existence and resistance to provide ethnic Albanians with the Woodian “pleasure of agency,” demonstrating to the put-upon population that resistance was indeed possible. The KLA appeared to willingly surrender some of its autonomy in 1999, though, as international involvement became more likely in the wake of the Racak Massacre.[[292]](#footnote-292) This was, after all, a major goal of the insurgency—attract foreign intervention so that Serbian military might could be effectively countered.

 Beyond this, it appears that the KLA was able to organize some degree of healthcare provision. Medical professionals who volunteered to assist the KLA were organized by operational zone, with each zone coordinated by a health services coordinator. While clearly beneficial to fighters, it appears that the majority of the patients seen were civilians.[[293]](#footnote-293)

 The postwar period is particularly instructive. The KLA, conquering heroes of Kosovar Albanians, became a growing political problem, as mayhem committed by young “fighters” claiming to be KLA veterans became more than just a public nuisance.[[294]](#footnote-294) This became one of the factors driving Kosovo’s elections—in order to prevent rule by insurgent fighters, Kosovo’s population must have the opportunity to vote for someone else. This is significant as it demonstrates the relative lack of a political project during the conflict. The sum total of the KLA’s political project was secession by force of arms, hopefully supported by foreign intervention.

**Lebanon (1975-1990)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Muslim militias,[[295]](#footnote-295) Syria, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) / Lebanon, Christian militias, Israel

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The Lebanese Civil War is extraordinarily complicated. In addition to the scores of “sides” which participate, the coalitions collapse and reform several times over the war’s 15 years. Making matters still more complicated, the war has three distinct stages. The initial conflict burns out quickly, lasting only from 1975 to 1976.[[296]](#footnote-296) Syria intervened in 1976 (although not on the side of the Muslim Lebanese National Movement (LNM)), in part out of fear of what might happen should the conflict continue to rage on but in part out of fear of what might happen should the LNM’s PLO allies come to dominate the alliance.[[297]](#footnote-297) Between 1976 and 1982, the Lebanese government (under the watchful eye of Syria) attempted to work out an agreement between the warring sides.[[298]](#footnote-298)

This simmering conflict transformed back into all out war shattered when Israel invaded in 1982, allying itself with the Christian Lebanese Front (LF).[[299]](#footnote-299) Amal and the Progressive Social Party (PSP) composed the largest Muslim coalition at this point, with both parties emerging from the dilapidating LNM-PLO alliance. While the LF, PSP, and Amal hammered out the terms of the Taif Agreement which would ultimately serve as the instrument by which the war was ended, Hezbollah began to emerge in 1988, largely as a result of Iranian patronage and direction.[[300]](#footnote-300)

In spite of the large number of combatants in the conflict, rebel governance was hard to come by. The constant rearrangement of alliances[[301]](#footnote-301) contributed to this, as did the nominal functioning of the state and state services, even as their actual provision collapsed. The most culpable appears to have been the groups themselves, who often endeavored to secure some sort of concessions instead of territory.[[302]](#footnote-302) This undoubtedly reduced the costs of such campaigns—it is far easier to inflict pain than to establish some means of administering territory and people.

This was not always the case, though. Early in the conflict, Christian militias coordinated to try and secure a contiguous Christian enclave.[[303]](#footnote-303) Interestingly, though, the only evidence of rebel governance came at the hands of the PLO, who had relocated much of their infrastructure from Jordan to Lebanon before the war began.[[304]](#footnote-304) This infrastructure included the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), which operated clinics and hospitals within Lebanon (albeit not exclusively for their benefit).[[305]](#footnote-305) The organization also runs a teacher’s union, but this appears to have been incorporated within the larger infrastructure of Lebanese education, not as a parallel institution within controlled territory.[[306]](#footnote-306) Additionally, although the PLO sports a complex system of consensus governance, this system operates outside of territorial bounds—indeed, the largest delegation within the central committee as of 1982 was in Jordan. However, it appears that this manifestation was some form of rebel governance—indeed, Edouard Ghurra, Lebanon’s delegate to the UN, described the PLO as operating a “state within a state” as a means of establishing the group’s nefarious intentions.[[307]](#footnote-307) Israel’s invasion in 1982 spelled the end of the PLO[[308]](#footnote-308) as it had operated previously,[[309]](#footnote-309) but these attempts at governance are noteworthy all the same.

**Liberia (1989-1993)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) / Liberia (later ULIMO)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Liberia’s first civil war brought with it a rapid descent into pandemonium. President Samuel Doe suffered a distressing deficit of legitimacy stemming from allegations that his 1985 election had been determined by way of electoral fraud.[[310]](#footnote-310) Worse, even though rebel forces controlled the vast majority of the country outside of the capital Monrovia, NPFL leader Charles Taylor seemed singularly disinterested in governing, even when it came to disciplining his own forces.[[311]](#footnote-311)

 In these early stages, the closest thing to policing came in the form of brutal reprisals against starving looters on the part of what passed for the standing armies in the conflict.[[312]](#footnote-312) The general lack of discipline on the part of the rebels and the lack of interest in policing their newfound territory meant that the NPFL were contributing to the war’s chaos rather than causing it to abate. This diminished somewhat after the war’s first spasms of brutality, although it was hardly due to Taylor’s (or his lieutenants’) direct efforts.[[313]](#footnote-313) He encouraged traditional sources of localized authority to operate as they had previously but did nothing to directly aid in their administration of justice.[[314]](#footnote-314)

Health provision was also especially poor. The country’s hospitals ceased functioning almost as soon as the war began, leaving patients in desperately squalid conditions.[[315]](#footnote-315) Lack of funds, staff, and even electricity meant that the sick or injured were better off fending for themselves than going to a hospital. Schools suffered similar neglect—mass education was not a priority in the midst of the conflict, and so its provision dwindled.[[316]](#footnote-316)

Although one could be forgiven for believing that consultative instruments had either formed or functioned over the conflict’s course, this is not the case.[[317]](#footnote-317) Originally, elections had been scheduled for October, 1991. These elections were never held. There *was* an election held for an interim president in 1990, won by Amos Sawyer.[[318]](#footnote-318) However, this was not a popular election; Sawyer was selected by a group of delegates at The Banjul Conference. While elections were held after the war’s close, little development of consultative instruments appear during the conflict.

**Liberia (1994-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: NPFL / ULIMO

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Much that can be said about the Liberian civil war’s first chapter can be said about its second. Taylor’s NPFL did little to further the provision of policing, justice, or public goods from 1994 to 1996. This was especially detrimental as civil society actors were often unable or unwilling to fill the gap.[[319]](#footnote-319) Liberia’s population, Emmanuel Dolo argues, had been conditioned to expect disappointing outcomes from political leaders. This was exacerbated by the fact that public service was viewed as a means of extracting rents rather than of providing effective administration.

 While the interim government remained in some form until the end of the conflict, its activity as a feedback mechanism did not manifest itself until the July, 1997 elections.[[320]](#footnote-320) In spite of the apparent legitimacy of those elections,[[321]](#footnote-321) governance outcomes were uninspiring even after Taylor’s electoral victory, to say nothing of their status beforehand.[[322]](#footnote-322) It appears that the statebuilding efforts that took place after this chapter’s close were working with very little native resources on the part of the rebels.

**Liberia (1999-2003)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) / Liberia

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 1**

 Charles Taylor’s postwar peace was quite brief, as simmering discontent with his regime (from both opponents and would-be clients)paired with his inability to establish a monopoly of force within the state meant recidivism was hardly surprising, albeit with Taylor playing the part of the incumbent in this chapter.[[323]](#footnote-323) This combined with Taylor’s difficulties securing revenue meant that his defeat should also come as little surprise.[[324]](#footnote-324) What is somewhat surprising was that a) Taylor had the opportunity to resign and flee into exile without much protest from the victorious rebels and that b) he actually took it.

 The LURD rebels (many of whom were late of ULIMO) took pains to make themselves seem legitimate, both to the outside world and to their fellow Liberians.[[325]](#footnote-325) In addition to rigorous discipline within their ranks (especially with regards to the treatment of civilians), LURD established a separate and (to a certain extent) effective civil administrative apparatus. In particular, they were concerned with providing domestic security and with refilling civil administrative positions within controlled territories (the new occupants of these offices often came from the populations themselves). Although the particulars of the larger structure of this administration are difficult to determine, there is a degree of local representation in the group’s political wing, as well as ministries for the provision of public goods.[[326]](#footnote-326) Although discipline within their ranks was extremely inconsistent in spite of its emphasis on the part of the commanders, this was diminished by the impressing of refugees into a fact-finding mission to examine civilian-rebel interactions. Moreover, as a part of its effort to increase discipline, the group established “forums for hearing local grievances” against rebel fighters.[[327]](#footnote-327) While LURD’s legitimacy-seeking behavior bore some fruit, they were hardly model governors and by no means free of deliberate attacks on civilian populations.

 Their targeted attacks on civilian areas are especially problematic from a governance standpoint. In addition to effectively emptying Ganta—once a regional hub—of its civilian population, the town’s education and healthcare infrastructure had been obliterated by the conflict, with little (if anything) appearing in its place.[[328]](#footnote-328) Additionally, in spite of attempts at reining in disorderly soldiers, LURD’s fighters regularly preyed upon the populations in their controlled territories.[[329]](#footnote-329) Moreover, LURD units would routinely execute prisoners of war who do not show remorse and some reports point to particular brutality in the treatment of those POW’s who did not wish to join the cause.[[330]](#footnote-330)

 MODEL was less successful, although their ambitions were similar in kind, if not magnitude, to those of LURD.[[331]](#footnote-331) MODEL’s commanders took pains to instill some degree of discipline among their numbers (albeit with limited success). Although there was a much ballyhooed instance of MODEL soldiers repairing damaged streetlights after taking a town, the extent of MODEL’s governance could be charitably described as “benign neglect.”

**Mali (1990-1995)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Several. Some include MPA (Azawad People's Movement) FIAA (Islamic Arab Front), MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad), FPLA (Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (FPLA), which became ARLA (Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad) a few months later / Mali

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Mali’s civil war technically dragged on for five years, but the actual incidence of conflict was far more sporadic than other conflicts of similar length.[[332]](#footnote-332) There was little cohesion among the various Tuareg rebel groups. Dissolution, absorption, and reformation was common. Indeed, one of the primary reasons the conflict dragged on for as long as it did was the fact that Mali’s army did such a poor job discriminating between rebel and civilian, leading many of the latter category to support the former.[[333]](#footnote-333)

 The chaos among the rebel groups was not conducive to the production of the goods of governance. One of the Tuareg rebels’ raisons de guerre was a lack of access to services—particularly health and education—and this was not changed by the end of the conflict. Moreover, while the Malian government has held elections (including one during the conflict) and incorporated Tuareg into the armed forces and police,[[334]](#footnote-334) there is little evidence of the rebels providing these things for themselves during the conflict.[[335]](#footnote-335)

**Moldova (1991-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Transnistra Separatists / Moldova

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The civil war in Moldova pitted newly independent Moldova against its secessionist, ostensibly pro-Russian region to the east of the Dniester River.[[336]](#footnote-336) Although the war began with a Transnistran referendum result which appears to support independence, this may not necessarily be the case. First, the referendum calls for independence under the auspices of the Soviet Union—something of a contradiction in terms. Second, the referendum was conducted under less than free and fair circumstances. Igor Smirnov’s supporters intimidated and killed critics of independence in the region and portrayed non-independence as tantamount to annexation by Romania.[[337]](#footnote-337) Additionally, much of the parallel state’s functions’ development took place after the war had come to a close.[[338]](#footnote-338)

 Instead, after securing an ostensible mandate to rule the would-be state, Igor Smirnov and his supporters threw their efforts into recruiting support for the war effort. This came in the form of volunteers from Transnistra, naturally, but also included calls for support from Russia.[[339]](#footnote-339) Russian intervention was crucial to securing a negotiated end (or pause) to the conflict, but efforts to incorporate Transnistran interests into Moldova’s governance structure have been met with hostility on the part of the separatists. Instead, the separatists have busied themselves trying to establish a facsimile of a functional state, with mixed results at best.[[340]](#footnote-340)

**Morocco (1976-1991)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Polisario Front / Morocco

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 2**

 The Polisario Front was formed in 1973, before Morocco had a claim to Western Sahara.[[341]](#footnote-341) At the time, the region was still a Spanish colonial holding. By 1975, the UN was convinced that Western Sahara should become an independent state. However, Morocco, who had argued unsuccessfully that it should be allowed to annex the region in 1956, invaded, quickly securing de facto control. Shortly thereafter, Spain relinquished its claim on Western Sahara. The Polisario front, still determined to secure independence, began a decades-long military and political campaign against Moroccan rule.

 The Polisario Front have supported their cause internationally by seeking (and acquiring) membership into the Organization of African Unity in 1982 for their Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).[[342]](#footnote-342) Although this led to chaos within the organization, its accession was not without reason; since the conflict’s outset, The Polisario Front has taken pains to establish a parallel state with all of the requisite institutional trappings. While SADR was by no means a consolidated state, it was able to provide some of the goods of governance to its subject population.

 The most impressive of these trappings was SADR’s electoral basis. From early on in the conflict, the proto-state had a complex political authority structure that relied on popular elections.[[343]](#footnote-343) Although popular decision-making has roots in Sharawi culture, this is impressive nonetheless. Another element of rebel governance which manifested itself based in part on its place in Sahrawi culture is education. One of the first elements of governance the Polisario Front used against their former colonial masters was a series of schools for women which also served as a means of recruitment. While not as robust as its educational system, SADR also boasted a number of health clinics.[[344]](#footnote-344)

 One of the reasons that SADR has been more successful in providing education than medicine is the problem of materials, but it also bears mentioning that education is also better incorporated into SADR’s micro-level political organization.[[345]](#footnote-345) While education as well as policing, justice, and food distribution are handled at this level, health is not[[346]](#footnote-346) (likely a reflection of the difficulties providing medicine in non-village camps). With that said, observers marveled at the degree to which these organizational implements functioned as designed in spite of the ongoing struggle against the Moroccan state.

**Mozambique (1982-1992)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RENAMO / FRELIMO

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

See Case Study Chapter

**Nepal (1996-2006)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Communist Party of Nepal / Nepal

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 2**

 Nepal’s Maoist insurgency was driven by a myriad of factors.[[347]](#footnote-347) Extreme poverty, official corruption, and the lack of meaningful change from democratization seem to have been especially effective, although this is hardly an exhaustive list. Regardless, the hills of mid-western Nepal (especially the Rolpa district) served as an incubator for a decade-long civil war which would see the end of a centuries-old monarchy.[[348]](#footnote-348)

 Nepal’s Maoists had a clear political agenda which from the beginning they took pains to establish. One of the first manifestations of this was the institution of “People’s Courts.”[[349]](#footnote-349) Corruption in state courts and pressure from insurgents ensured that there were always plenty of grievances that these ad-hoc courts could hear and adjudicate. Another early manifestation of Maoist governance was the collection of taxes, although some of the taxed would likely protest at these contributions being described as such. For instance, Nishchal Nath Pandey describes some of the contributions from banks as little more than robberies.[[350]](#footnote-350)

 Between 1998 and 2001, the Communist Party of Nepal began to establish a more comprehensive “people’s government” as a parallel to the state.[[351]](#footnote-351) This allowed the party to set up a bounded matrix within which their subject populations could interact with the party and (more importantly) a means by which that population could participate in their own administration. People’s committees were filled originally by members selected during mass meetings, but soon after elections for positions were held. The administration also took over the provision of education, which was specifically anti-Sanskrit, as the institutions associated with religion in Nepal were seen as responsible for popular repression.

**Nicaragua (1981-1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Contras (Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), Misura) / Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The Sandinista rebels made quick work of Somoza’s repressive regime in Nicaragua, but their victory would be short-lived. Right wing militias formed in the wake of the revolution began to violently contest Sandinista control of the country.[[352]](#footnote-352) The FDN, operating in the north of the country, was by far the largest and most dangerous of the militias, taking advantage both of popular support and American patronage.

 In spite of their successes, the contras were not effective rulers. They, unlike their adversaries, lacked a unified, coherent political agenda, in part due to a lack of unity among the militias.[[353]](#footnote-353) For instance, Misura ostensibly fought for regional autonomy, not to seize the commanding heights of governmental power.[[354]](#footnote-354) Regardless, contra militias (especially the FDN) enjoyed some degree of territorial control, but did little to administer it.[[355]](#footnote-355) The extent of their administration was to organize networks of informants. After all, contra forces lacked the wherewithal to defeat Sandinista forces, but they did not lack the ability to inflict pain.[[356]](#footnote-356)

**Nigeria (1980-1984)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Yan Tatsine / Nigeria

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The early 1980’s saw the rise of a peculiar brand of Islamic Fundamentalism driven by a self-proclaimed prophet who went by the nickname “Maitatsine.” His Yan Tatsine group participated in violent riots in the early 1980’s which ultimately cost the group’s leader his life in 1980. In spite of the relatively crude means of pursuing them, their goals were relatively well-articulated; Yan Tatsine wanted the liquidation of the Nigerian state and to replace it with an Islamic theocracy which would embody both religious and social tenets of Maitatsine’s interpretation of Islam.[[357]](#footnote-357)

 The group was able to attract a fair number of followers, particularly in the more devoutly Muslim northern regions of the country.[[358]](#footnote-358) However, many who supported the movement were attracted primarily by its call for redistributory policies as Nigeria’s poor tended to live in fairly stark deprivation.[[359]](#footnote-359) This is exacerbated by Nigeria’s oil wealth, which enriched a small number of Nigerians.[[360]](#footnote-360) Yan Tatsine does not appear to have done very much to remedy this, however; the movement is far more notable for its profound bloodlust and sadistic treatment of captives than for its economically equitable policies.

 Indeed, it is not clear that Yan Tatsine *had* policies beyond fanatical discipline within its “ranks.”[[361]](#footnote-361) It is more accurate to describe the movement as a manifestation of profound discontent at the selective prosperity brought about by Nigeria’s oil boom than to describe it as an organized rebel group. It operated sporadically, only manifesting itself in kidnappings and violent riots targeting symbols of the Nigerian state.

**Pakistan (2004-2006)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Remnants of the Taliban and sympathetic warlords / Pakistan

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Pakistan faced violent uprisings in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) between 2004 and 2006. Between Pakistan’s neglect of these regions and the resentment this neglect caused, it stands to reason that the Taliban would seek a foothold in Northwest Pakistan.[[362]](#footnote-362) The government’s primary mode of response was to offer bilateral peace agreements, in spite of the threat that these groups posed to the Pakistani state. Indeed, this threat would manifest itself again in 2009 when the Swat valley would come under siege.[[363]](#footnote-363)

 In spite of the near complete lack of state presence in the region, it appears that the Taliban and the warlords aligned with it were either ill-prepared to serve as rulers or were unwilling to undertake the project (at least until after it liquidated the state). The warlord population appears to have been even less concerned with governing—their primary interest appears to have been squeezing the state for as many resources as could be had in exchange for something resembling acquiescence to de jure state control. In this regard, what popular support there was for Taliban control makes some degree of sense; although thoroughly unregulated and spectacularly brutal, Taliban control brought with it some form of criminal justice.[[364]](#footnote-364)

**Papua New Guinea (1989-1998)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Bougainville Revolutionary Army / Papua New Guinea

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The civil war in Papua New Guinea centered around the secessionist movement of Bougainville, one of PNG’s several constituent islands. Secessionist forces in the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were quickly able to overtake incumbent forces, and by March of 1990, PNG forces (and officials) retreated from the islands.[[365]](#footnote-365) Thereafter, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) declared the island a new independent state. In spite of its rapid victory, little of PNG’s administrative apparatus remained, leaving BIG scrambling to administer its territory.

 Early failures in providing basic security led to dissention among the populace, as BRA cadres tasked with maintaining domestic security used their mandate as a means of acquiring wealth and settling scores.[[366]](#footnote-366) Eventually, some cadres were employed by certain localities as effective domestic security, but it appears to have been done independently of the aloof BIG. In fact, by 1992 the PNG government began to covertly supply the BRA cadres which took on these security responsibilities. Unsurprisingly, this led to a shift in hostilities from BRA vs. PNG forces to BRA vs. repurposed BRA cadres.[[367]](#footnote-367)

 While order was clearly not forthcoming, law was another matter. While not entirely successful, BIG empowered local chiefs with substantial powers by creating a Council of Chiefs.[[368]](#footnote-368) In addition to granting administrative powers, the council gave chiefs the responsibility to act as adjudicators in disputes. While the application of this ambitious project was wildly inconsistent due to predatory BRA cadres, it represents the most profound of BIG’s wartime administrative successes, such as they are.

 The dismantling of Bougainville’s administrative apparatus was intentional—even if BIG administered the islands, if it could not provide healthcare or education, popular support for independence would wither, so the thinking went.[[369]](#footnote-369) BIG focused more of its efforts on producing domestic security (which it failed to accomplish) so it is perhaps unsurprising that PNG’s boycott of goods and services successfully crippled their provision in Bougainville.[[370]](#footnote-370) Schools and hospitals were not merely neglected—most of them had been destroyed.

 While BIG intended on ultimately holding elections,[[371]](#footnote-371) these were not forthcoming during the conflict. Clashes between former comrades gave PNG forces a window of opportunity to return to the island and begin fighting the BRA directly. Elections did eventually come about, but not until well after the conflict.[[372]](#footnote-372) Other than input from chiefs, BIG had no consultative instruments to speak of.

**Peru (1980-1997)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Sendero Luminoso (SL; Shining Path) / Peru

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 2**

 SL began its civil war against the Peruvian state just as that state had begun to institute land reforms similar to those which El Salvador’s FMLN had supported.[[373]](#footnote-373) Whether because of the lack of impact the reforms had in the regions from which SL had sprung or because SL’s founders sensed weakness in the state is immaterial. What matters is that the civil war which followed was profoundly brutal and long. During the course of the conflict, SL had established fairly extensive zones of control which it administered enthusiastically (and bloodily).

In spite of its profound brutality and the damage this brutality did to its popularity, SL took pains to establish instruments of rebel governance, especially education.[[374]](#footnote-374) Indeed, one of the first manifestations of SL as a political entity was educational. Although that education was ideological, the provision of basic education was part and parcel to SL’s agenda.[[375]](#footnote-375) SL also established a clearly defined political role for subject populations in governing themselves—the group established Open People’s Committees composed entirely of civilians to administer their own towns and villages in which the members’ “[p]articipation involved exercising leadership and authority.”[[376]](#footnote-376) These People’s Committees consisted of five functionally defined commissars. These included a committee secretary, security commissar, a production commissar, a commissar of communal affairs, and a commissar in charge of people’s organizations.[[377]](#footnote-377)

Public goods were provided by the communal affairs commissar. While efforts to establish a system of education was largely successful, medical provision was somewhat less impressive. It primarily relied upon medicine raided from local hospitals or traditional herbal remedies.[[378]](#footnote-378) With that said, McClintock notes that SL’s efforts were more impressive in the realm of material benefits than the FMLN,[[379]](#footnote-379) and the state’s healthcare provision during the conflict was not particularly inspiring, either.[[380]](#footnote-380)

SL’s attempts at providing policing and juridical functions were generally successful, even though the latter was more prevalent than the former. For instance, aside from targeted assassinations, [[381]](#footnote-381) there appears to have been few instruments of policing,[[382]](#footnote-382) even though the security commissar was placed in charge of internal security in addition to coordinating military activities.[[383]](#footnote-383) SL members did issue warnings to individuals who were seen to break the group’s behavioral mandates, with repeat or serious offenders often executed by beheading.[[384]](#footnote-384) SL’s juridical functions were more prevalent.[[385]](#footnote-385) The commissar of communal affairs handled marriages and divorces, while a popular “damages committee” handled grievances among civilians.[[386]](#footnote-386) There were also reports of “people’s trials” in which members of the community could speak on behalf of the accused (if they dared). There were some reports that service in a guerilla column could earn someone absolution.[[387]](#footnote-387)

The group’s consultative instruments were more impressive still. In addition to popular participation in these local policymaking and enforcement instruments, the fifth commissar’s duties included organizing popular political activities. For instance, delegates from the people’s organizations in a given village for a people’s assembly which in turn elects a people’s committee commissar.[[388]](#footnote-388) While strategic and military planning was tightly controlled by the party itself, these popular activities—particularly those in which civilians directly participated in—were to play a key role in propelling a revolution in the cities, not merely to legitimate the violence of the revolution.[[389]](#footnote-389)

**Philippines (1972-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) / Philippines

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 As the predominantly Christian Philippine government consolidated its position, previously self-governing groups found themselves to be suddenly subordinate in the 1950’s and 1960’s. In response to this loss of sovereignty, the enforcement of a new set of laws, and what was seen as inequitable application of those laws the MNLF began a decades-long civil war against the Philippine state in 1972.[[390]](#footnote-390) In spite of the tradition of self-government, the MNLF did little to provide the goods of governance to its controlled territories.

 To a certain extent, this came about because of organizational deficiencies.[[391]](#footnote-391) Never a terribly well-organized resistance movement, the group struggled to formalize its relationship with the population of its controlled territories, in spite of that population’s enthusiastic support. This deficiency could be seen in the MNLF’s struggles to govern itself after the conflict.[[392]](#footnote-392) There were concerted efforts to re-establish independent legal authority, although their impact was somewhat limited.[[393]](#footnote-393) Although independent courts were established, their authority was undercut by inconsistent reliance upon them by the population. Additionally, the continued participation of Muslims in Philippine politics undercut the demand for governing institutions.

**Romania (1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Anti-Governmental Factions (eventually represented as National Salvation Front) / Socialist Republic of Romania

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Nicolai Ceausescu’s grip on Romania had dwindled to a substantial extent by December of 1989, but few could have imagined that the dictator’s regime, built largely on a cult of personality, would be toppled in a matter of days. One reason for the rapidity of Communist Romania’s downfall was the fact that shortly after the uprising began in Timisoara in mid-December, substantial portions of Romania’s army and communist party joined in.[[394]](#footnote-394)

 Unsurprisingly, the extraordinarily brief civil war ended before the opposition could begin to organize itself as a government. Although the Ceausescus were tried before they were killed, it was hardly representative of a state applying force according to some notion of rule of law. Indeed, some observers noted that it bore much of the excesses and deficits of the Stalinist regime which it opposed. [[395]](#footnote-395) Even several years after the revolution had ended, the transition to democracy remained incomplete; the revolution could almost not help the fact that it experienced no real development of governance over its course.

**Russia (1994-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Chechen Separatists / Russia

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The ongoing Chechen conflict’s first act was a humiliating defeat for the Russian incumbents. The Chechen separatists were able to make and defend their claim to independence and began the process of constructing a parallel state structure to administer their homeland. One would expect then, that one would find ample evidence of wartime rebel governance developments. This is not the case.

 First, the independent Chechen state established its popular legitimacy in 1991 with elections in October and a declaration of independence the following month.[[396]](#footnote-396) It similarly cannot be argued that the parliament and presidencies role as a feedback mechanism was novel enough in 1994 to be counted as a novel *wartime* development.[[397]](#footnote-397) Additionally, most new developments in governance had more to do with its collapse than its progression.

 The provision of public goods appears to have been particularly hard hit. Education ceased altogether save for those which could either be a) paid for by parents or b) the teachers continued working without receiving payment.[[398]](#footnote-398) Healthcare provision was even more desultory, although not for lack of the effort on the part of doctors and nurses. In addition to harrowing accounts of overstretched staff trying to wade through a sea of the dead and dying,[[399]](#footnote-399) Chechen medical personnel had to deal with an almost unfathomably high infant mortality (10%), which some observers suggest was exacerbated by the alleged use of chemical weapons on the part of the Russians.[[400]](#footnote-400)

 In part due to their skill in fighting the Russians, Islamists in Chechnya were able to secure a substantial concession which presaged their prominent position in contemporary Chechen politics. Beginning in April, 1995, courts purpose-built to apply sharia law operated parallel to secular ones, eventually replacing secular courts entirely after the war’s end. Although this is an important development in governance during the war, it does not represent a substantially novel proficiency of the state, as courts already existed within the separatist would-be state.

**Rwanda (1990-1993)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Rwandan Patriotic Front / Rwanda

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Although ostensibly representing Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front to fight for the rights of the members of the put-upon ethnic community.[[401]](#footnote-401) In spite of French assistance, the RPF made substantial gains within Rwanda. Ultimately, the RPF was able to secure a negotiated end to this chapter of the conflict. The short-lived agreement provided instruments of power-sharing and promised elections.

 The RPF’s record as wartime governors is most charitably described as incomplete. The state’s ability to administer itself collapsed during the conflict, and RPF’s leadership appeared to be ill-suited to creating an administration ex nihilo.[[402]](#footnote-402) The legal system, already hamstrung by a lack of public confidence, ceased to function altogether during the conflict. The RPF was in a poor position to replace it—its number were largely not Rwandan, but Ugandan. Its public support came almost entirely from the brutal reprisals against the Tutsi and moderate Hutu.

 A more stringent evaluation of RPF governance would be quite poor, though. The RPF did very little to support or even engage with the local population. Wiliam Cyrus Reed remarks that, while many guerilla operations seek to politicize the peasant population within their controlled territory, the RPF made no such attempts.[[403]](#footnote-403) Instead, they preferred to leave displaced peasants up to the government, placing additional strain on an administration which was also poorly-suited to the job.

**Rwanda (1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Rwandan Patriotic Front / Rwanda, Interahamwe militias

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Hutu resentment of the power-sharing agreement signed in Arusha was palpable in 1994. In spite of constituting a fifth of the population, the agreement called for Tutsis to constitute 40% of the country’s armed forces (for instance). These resentments reached fever pitch when President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, killing him.[[404]](#footnote-404) Following a genocidal series of reprisals, the RPF began a brief campaign in April of 1994, defeating Rwanda’s armed forces in a matter of months.

 The RPF’s performance in the conflict’s second chapter proceeded much like the first. For example, Rwanda’s health service was devastated during the conflict. What healthcare could be had was provided by foreign parties.[[405]](#footnote-405) The RPF appears to have been largely uninvolved in these efforts. Although it is unlikely that even concentrated efforts to establish instruments of governance could bear fruits in such a brief conflict, there is little evidence that the RPF would have bothered even had the conflict dragged on much longer.

**Sierra Leone (1991-1996)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Revolutionary United Front (RUF) / Sierra Leone, Executive Outcomes (1995 and forward)

**Policing/juridical: 1; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The RUF, a collection of fighters from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, and Liberian partisans of Charles Taylor, invaded eastern Sierra Leone in March of 1991.[[406]](#footnote-406) The early days of the conflict were especially difficult for the incumbents, as many Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) soldiers spent at least some of their time supporting the rebels. To make matters worse, the central government was unable to provide medical treatment for their wounded or even salaries, leading to a protest in the capital. Sierra Leonean president Joseph Saidu Momoh believed the protest was, in fact, a coup and fled the country. A military regime—the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)—filled the power vacuum, appointing Captain Valentine Strasser as its leader.

 In spite of their territorial conquests, securing popular support was difficult.[[407]](#footnote-407) One reason for this is their brutal treatment of their would-be subjects. In spite of this, RUF had, by war’s end, engaged in some efforts to organize and administer its controlled territories.[[408]](#footnote-408) To the extent that RUF was interested in revolution, they emphasized a return to communitarian, agrarian society which mixed private agriculture with community farming projects to feed soldiers (there is some disagreement over whether and to what extent RUF soldiers engaged in agriculture themselves[[409]](#footnote-409)). In spite of the fairly limited political or ideological scope of their struggle, the RUF did engage in rebel governance.

 This included to the provision of education and healthcare.[[410]](#footnote-410) This is especially noteworthy given the desultory state of the government’s provision of both.[[411]](#footnote-411) RUF provision of public goods was often interrupted due to lack of supplies (or loss of territory), though. Moreover, provision appears to have been of questionable quality even under the best circumstances. Regardless, beginning in 1994, the group appeared to have made arrangements to provide healthcare and education, something that the government struggled to achieve at the time.

 The RUF also provided mechanisms for policing and juridical, although their performance and purpose were both limited.[[412]](#footnote-412) RUF policing included mechanisms for enforcing their brand of retributive justice between soldiers and from soldiers to civilians, but not between civilians. Furthermore, one of the more common punishments for bad behavior among the soldiers was to be sent to the front line, where predatory behavior could not be as easily monitored or curtailed. This, Krijn Peters argues, is one reason for the degree to which the RUF was guilty of monstrous abuses of the Sierra Leonean people. Additionally, as much as their adjudicative system was impressively transparent and functional,[[413]](#footnote-413) there was an important limit to punishments—the RUF was always short of manpower. Therefore, if an infraction was not serious enough to kill the perpetrator, then this perpetrator would remain in RUF’s forces.

 The input from civilians was quite limited, in spite of their democratizing rhetoric.[[414]](#footnote-414) Civilians were far more likely to be targeted as suspected supporters of the Sierra Leonean government than to be asked for input in policymaking.[[415]](#footnote-415) The exception appears to have been the recruitment of interlocutors between civilian and military actors. Occasionally, civilians would be asked to name fighters who would make good “G5” officers, an element of RUF policing which specifically dealt with grievances between soldiers and civilians.

**Sierra Leone (1997-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RUF, AFRC / Sierra Leone, ECOMOG

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Sierra Leone’s first and second civil wars happened in quick succession. Dissatisfied SLA officers executed a coup, establishing the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in May of 1997.[[416]](#footnote-416) Originally incorporating the RUF into the fold, the AFRC sought to overturn the elected civilian government. Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) forces intervened on their behalf, eventually leading to the AFRC’s defeat in the capital of Freetown in 1998.[[417]](#footnote-417)

 This second chapter of the conflict saw the limited policing and juridical mechanisms effectively collapse.[[418]](#footnote-418) Even though G5 agents maintained their positions, responsibilities, and de jure authority, soldiers who had already committed atrocities against civilians began threatening officers who tried to enforce RUF discipline. Thus, even though the institutions remained, their function all but evaporated by the end of the conflict.

 The same could not be said for public good provision. If anything, RUF territory saw much improved health and education provision, at least at the start of the second conflict.[[419]](#footnote-419) This diminished towards the conflict’s end, though; as RUF saw its non-looting sources of funding dry up and its controlled territory shrink, the provision of healthcare and education suffered, especially outside of the Kailahun district. This lack of resources was especially problematic for healthcare provision. By the end of the conflict, RUF healthcare had all but disappeared.

 Once again, while the rebels acted as rulers, they did little to elicit input from their subjects. While atrocities were much rarer deep into RUF territory—where monitoring was still possible—there were no formal auspices under which civilians could impact policy decisions.[[420]](#footnote-420) The most one could hope for in these territories would be forming a relationship with members of RUF who could ensure one’s safety deep in RUF territory.

**Sierra Leone (2000-2001)**

Rebels / Incumbents: RUF / Sierra Leone

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The third and final chapter of the Sierra Leonean civil war in this dataset comes shortly after the end of the previous one with the collapse of the Lomé Accord.[[421]](#footnote-421) With the support of Liberian President Charles Taylor, RUF resumed its war against Sierra Leone,[[422]](#footnote-422) having used the brief peace to recover.[[423]](#footnote-423) This time, however, the war ended relatively quickly, as RUF’s prospects for survival dwindled, a negotiated end to hostilities became the only tenable option.

 RUF’s governance rested on the willingness of its leadership to commit to its supposed political objectives. By the third chapter of the conflict, this had evaporated. While the group had previously set up means of providing services similar to that of a functioning state, the third chapter of the conflict saw provision replaced by predation. For instance, as resources dwindled, civilians were increasingly pressed into service as diamond miners.[[424]](#footnote-424) This reflects the apparent loss of anything resembling a coherent ideology among the rank and file soldiers, particularly those who were recent recruits at this stage.[[425]](#footnote-425)

 Little remained of RUF’s efforts to establish a parallel society by the time this third chapter had begun. There were still some who attempted to maintain previous levels of service provision, resource scarcity made this extremely difficult.[[426]](#footnote-426) By conflict’s end, RUF was little more than a predatory group of bandits, securing what rents could be had by fighting on.

**South Africa (1983-1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: African National Congress (ANC), United Democratic Front (UDF) / South Africa Defense Force (SADF), South Africa

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 2**

 The South African civil war was a conflict brought on by discontent at the profound discrimination brought on by Apartheid policies. In response to the willingness to resort to violence on the part of the ANC, SADF engaged in open warfare.[[427]](#footnote-427) In addition, SADF personnel were granted broad immunity from prosecution for their behaviors as a result of the Defense Act, which granted absolution for many of the more grisly practices undertaken in the name of counterinsurgency.[[428]](#footnote-428)

 While the postwar transition has received ample coverage, the course of the war itself, particularly from a political standpoint, is another matter entirely. What is known is that the ANC engaged in an ambitious governance strategy beginning in the 1980’s, with the group calling for dissatisfied black South Africans to create parallel governing structures to destabilize the South African government’s hold on the country. Young people responded to the ANC’s call, creating street committees in the conflict’s first year. These committees attempted to enforce a competing vision of law and order—occasionally erring quite far on the retributive side of the scale. They also solicited community concerns and tried, to the best of their ability to address them.[[429]](#footnote-429)

 These committees were eventually incorporated into the rebels’ leadership scheme, although not without some difficulty.[[430]](#footnote-430) In addition to ad hoc justice and problem solving, these committees took on a surprising amount of representative burdens.[[431]](#footnote-431) Where the rebels were strongest, each street had an elected committee to represent it. Several streets comprised an “area,” with towns constituting between 16 and 20 areas. The street committees elected area committees and the area committees each elected two representatives (normally one younger and one older) to sit on the Area Committee Council. Each level dealt with policymaking, but also with issues related to punishing crimes (with more serious crimes being dealt with at higher levels. Their commitment to what one might view as mundane administration (water provision, garbage pickup, night-soil disposal) is similarly impressive.

 This committee system had profound impacts. Interviews with participants suggest a similar “pleasure in agency” that Wood describes from here work in El Salvador. Also, it appears as though the committees were able to negotiate the end of boycotts (which they arranged) with white businessmen, arranging deals to change corporate policies. This eventually spread to negotiations regarding establishing official nonracial municipal governance structures.[[432]](#footnote-432)

 Criminal justice improved the more the rebels attempted to incorporate it into their governance scheme. While the street committees initially practiced a spontaneous (and brutal, and inexact) form of “street justice,” the street committee hierarchy was able to bring about something of an appeals process.[[433]](#footnote-433) While still far from perfect, this system appears to have made substantial impacts within their controlled territory.

 In addition to township governance structures, the ANC established a small number of relatively self-sufficient camps in which children and young adults could pursue some degree of education. In addition to sending a small number of college-aged students abroad by way of scholarships, basic education was provided alongside ideological training.[[434]](#footnote-434) This is not to say that education only took place outside of the towns. Where government control was at its lowest ebb, the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) was able to develop new curricula and administer schools in towns such as Port Elizabeth.[[435]](#footnote-435)

 There was also an effective health service called the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA). NAMDA set about the task of providing alternatives to fighters, targets of police brutality and interrogations, and general health to the state-run clinics which government forces had begun to use as sources of information. By 1987 NAMDA was both providing care and providing first-aid training.[[436]](#footnote-436)

 This governance project was hamstrung by the SADF’d doubling down as the conflict progressed, though.[[437]](#footnote-437) The gambit did not ultimately pay off, with international diplomatic and economic pressure mounting as the 1980s came to a close.[[438]](#footnote-438) Ultimately, it appears as though the ANC and UDF were laying the groundwork for what would come afterward.

**Sri Lanka (1983-1987)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) / Sri Lankan Government (GoSL)

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

Although 1983’s “Black July” pogroms against Sri Lankan Tamils in response to a deadly attack on Sri Lankan soldiers[[439]](#footnote-439) marked the war’s beginning, the LTTE had been engaging in low-level anti-state activity since the mid-1970’s.[[440]](#footnote-440) Aside from these activities, the LTTE was primarily focused on consolidating public support for their cause and eliminating any competing pro-Tamil organizations. In part due to this single-mindedness, the group did very little to establish competing manifestations of governance.

LTTE did have a political office, but it fell beneath the military office in the group’s strictly enforced hierarchy.[[441]](#footnote-441) Indeed, Mampilly writes that GoSL remained in charge of administering justice and enforcing the law in LTTE territory throughout this phase of the war. Although this changed as the war’s next phase began, the transition was not to LTTE governance. Instead, the shift was external: their Indian patrons became the administrators of the territory in which the LTTE operated under the auspices of the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF).[[442]](#footnote-442)

**Sri Lanka (1987-1989)**

Rebels / Incumbents: LTTE / GoSL

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

The second phase of the conflict proceeded much like the first, only with the IPKF taking part as an external intervening party. Although the ostensible auspices of a civilian administration came into being in 1987, but until 1990, its list of accomplishments included negotiating with GoSL and the Indian Government in 1987 and little else.[[443]](#footnote-443)

 This second phase came to a close when the LTTE and GoSL perceived a common enemy in the IPKF.[[444]](#footnote-444) A short-lived alliance was struck, in part due to the extreme heavy-handedness of the Peacekeepers’ tactics and the accompanying violations of human rights. Ethnic Sinhalese resentment also played a major role in GoSL’s decision to arm the LTTE.[[445]](#footnote-445) At this point, the war ceased to be civil, at least briefly.

**Sri Lanka (1990-2002)**

Rebels / Incumbents: LTTE / GoSL

**Policing/juridical: 3; Public Goods: 2; Consultative instruments: 1**

 In the wake of the IPKF withdrawal, the LTTE wasted little time in establishing control of Sri Lanka’s northeastern provinces.[[446]](#footnote-446) It was at this point that the LTTE also began acting as governors as well as rebels, even as hostilities quickly resumed between the group and GoSL. In spite of their lack of success of until this point, LTTE administration achieved a remarkable level of competence relatively quickly.

 One of the secret’s to LTTE success in this realm is related one of Mampilly’s hypotheses: well-administered states tend to produce rebels who themselves are well-equipped to administer their territory.[[447]](#footnote-447) Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of Tamil administration during the war’s third chapter. Rather than dismantle GoSL’s structures of governance in an attempt to institutionalize their revolutionary agenda, LTTE essentially replicated GoSL’s structures to remarkable effect.[[448]](#footnote-448) While they largely replaced their territories’ domestic security forces, their cooption of Sri Lankan judicial institutions required much less turnover, at least institutionally. Although some of the legal system’s particulars were changed to fit their needs (for instance, land courts were established to determine land values so the rebels could more easily collect taxes), the penal code in Tamil Eelam resembled colonial British Law as much as did that of GoSL.[[449]](#footnote-449) These modes of governance replicated the application and enforcement of law and order in a well-administered state and the rebels enjoyed a noteworthy degree of legitimacy because of it.

 The provision of public goods was less successful. Providing healthcare within LTTE-controlled territories was especially difficult, due to a lack of pre-existing facilities in these territories, a GoSL embargo which greatly restricted supplies, and a hesitance among qualified Tamils to work in a warzone.[[450]](#footnote-450) Interestingly, the GoSL appeared to be more invested in healthcare provision in LTTE-controlled areas than even the LTTE.[[451]](#footnote-451)

 Education is another story. The LTTE was proactive in supporting education within its controlled territories, creating the Tamil Eelam Education Council (TEEC) to administer it.[[452]](#footnote-452) Although the war naturally made this more difficult, the success (and remarkable continuity) of educational provision in controlled areas is evident in the high levels of schooling and (relatively) low dropout levels achieved at war’s end (15%) in spite of two decades of nearly uninterrupted bloodshed.

 Although consultative instruments existed, the forms of feedback which were supported were closely curated by LTTE leadership. The LTTE was as dedicated to authoritarian governance as it was to being the sole instrument of Tamil liberation.[[453]](#footnote-453) Similarly, although the LTTE had developed its political wing by 2002, it was subordinate to the group’s military wing and effectively did not exist as an autonomous actor until just before the conflict’s respite, even as its activities increased dramatically during the 1990’s. As such, in spite of the LTTE’s incorporation of non-military figures in civil administration,[[454]](#footnote-454) the provision of consultative instruments is marginal in this case.

**Sudan (1983-2005)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) / Government of Sudan (GoS)

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 1**

See Case Study Chapter

**Tajikistan (1992-1997)**

Rebels / Incumbents: United Tajik Opposition (UTO) / Tajikistan

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Shortly after securing independence, Tajikistan was gripped by a civil war waged by various groups (predominantly Islamists and pro-democracy reformists) against the country’s post-Soviet government.[[455]](#footnote-455) These groups coalesced relatively quickly, forming the UTO after the initial victory of pro-government forces in December 1992.[[456]](#footnote-456) In spite of the ostensible pro-democracy stance of the UTO, very little in the way of governance developed over the course of the conflict.

 Although the war itself is remarkably lightly covered, some things are known. First, both the government and the UTO lacked traditional standing armies. Because of this, militias and criminal elements did much of the actual fighting in the war’s early proceedings.[[457]](#footnote-457) The relationship between civilian and combatant was, according to those accounts which do exist, purely exploitative. Those who were physically able to fight were conscripted into the first “army” that could find them and civilian material support to the combatants was given in the face of the (sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit) threat of violence.

**Turkey (1984-1999)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) / Turkey

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The PKK fought a 15 year guerilla campaign against the Turkish state as the 20th Century drew to a close. Their activities were aimed at securing secession, so they were focused on Turkey’s southeast, where Turkish Kurdistan borders with its Iraqi counterpart. These activities included attacking police and military targets, but Kurds who collaborated with the state were also targeted.[[458]](#footnote-458) The PKK were able to make substantial gains, exerting some degree of control over several towns in the early 1990’s.[[459]](#footnote-459) PKK influence wilted in the face of sustained military resistance, though. By decade’s end, the insurgency was effectively ended.

 While the PKK’s political efforts took shape in the early 20th Century, it does not appear that the group engaged in much ruling during the conflict.[[460]](#footnote-460) This appears to have come about for one central reason; the PKK’s “controlled territory” never resembled that of other rebel groups. Turkish forces possessed both superior capability and a mandate to use it with profound cruelty.[[461]](#footnote-461) Once Turkish control of Southeastern villages came into question, they were evacuated, leaving the PKK with no one to rule. To make matters worse, Turkish forced employed scorched earth tactics in reconquered territories. This left the “conquering” PKK with nothing when they won and even less when they lost.

**Uganda (1981-1986)**

Rebels / Incumbents: National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM), remnants of Idi Amin’s disbanded army / United National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A)

**Policing/juridical: 2; Public Goods: 1; Consultative instruments: 2**

 Milton Obote’s regime, still catching its breath after the ouster of Idi Amin, faced an existential crisis in the first of Uganda’s civil wars in the dataset. The NRM, livid at the results of what they perceived to be a rigged election, began its war with the UNLF’s Uganda in earnest.[[462]](#footnote-462) In spite of some early successes, the NRA appeared to be on the ropes in the wake of a 1983 offensive, but had recovered by 1985. Yoweri Museveni was installed as Uganda’s president in January of the next year.

 Museveni’s (and the NRM’s) democratizing rhetoric[[463]](#footnote-463) bore fruit quickly, as the ascendant party wasted no time installing democratic institutions and practices.[[464]](#footnote-464) However, the NRM’s governance project began during the conflict itself. The group established Resistance Councils in towns and villages which the NRA controlled.[[465]](#footnote-465) These councils were populated by members of the localities themselves elected by that same locality, mirroring the effective micro-level democratization seen in several other cases. [[466]](#footnote-466) The RC’s function went beyond representation, though. In addition to mobilizing support and providing the NRM with information pertinent to the war effort, they also began to be deployed in the service of law and order beginning in 1982.[[467]](#footnote-467) Their effectiveness can be seen in their mandate—the NRA used the RC’s to enforce a strict code of conduct for its rank-and-file soldiers.

 Wartime public good provision is another matter entirely. Although the Museveni regime has undertaken ambitious projects in health[[468]](#footnote-468) and education provision[[469]](#footnote-469) since the war’s conclusion, the state of both was desultory when he took office.[[470]](#footnote-470) One of the few exceptions were independent women’s organizations, who organized local schools and clinics (among many other functions) where they were able.[[471]](#footnote-471) The women in these organizations fiercely defended their independence and struggled (ultimately unsuccessfully) to maintain their autonomy after the war had come to a close. As such, even though Museveni courted their support as he was consolidating his presidency, these organizations had no formal relationship with the NRM.

 There is evidence of some efforts taken to remedy this during wartime, though.[[472]](#footnote-472) For instance, while generalized healthcare efforts were at best qualified successes due to insecurity, the NRA was able to tackle some particular health problems, such as the spread of malaria by way of NRA-organized clinics. Similarly, the NRA attempted to provide educational services, although their success was similarly limited due to insecurity.

**Uganda (1986-2006)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda People’s Democratic Army (until 1989), Holy Spirit Movement (until 1987) / NRM

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 Shortly after Obote’s ouster, the remnants of his defeated army began an insurgency under the guidance of Joseph Kony, terrorizing northern Uganda for two decades.[[473]](#footnote-473) In spite of its resiliency, the conflict is known more for its profound violence and Kony’s bizarre tendencies than any rebel governance project.[[474]](#footnote-474) Kony’s notorious use of child soldiers is well-reported, but the horrors visited upon Ugandans (and others—the army operated in neighboring countries as well) are staggering even when weighed against many of the cases described herein. Between Kony’s sadism and his unpredictable behavior, it is perhaps unsurprising that they did not participate in any sort of governance project.

 Nominally, there was a Lord’s Resistance Movement (LRM), but the connection between it and the LRA was unclear. It is unclear, for example, whether attempts to negotiate with this LRM, had they been successful, could have led to a cessation of violence as it was unclear that the ostensible political wing had any effect on the LRA or (most importantly) Kony.[[475]](#footnote-475) Towards the end of the conflict, Kony began to articulate a more coherent political vision, arguing that his was a fight for Ugandan democracy.[[476]](#footnote-476) Additionally, he paused operations in 1996, claiming that it was important to give Ugandans a chance to vote against Museveni. However, it was clear that if there was a broader political project, it was unknown to the rank-and-file soldiers. Many scholars have put themselves into a similar camp,[[477]](#footnote-477) arguing that if there was a political agenda, it was based on the whims of the LRA’s leader, not on a coherent idea.[[478]](#footnote-478)

**Yemen (North) (1994)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Democratic Republic of Yemen (Southern Separatists) / Republic of Yemen

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen had unified in May of 1990, but unification was problematic for a number of reasons. First, North Yemen (YAR) was substantially more prosperous, not to mention “sturdier.”[[479]](#footnote-479) Secondly, continuing lack of development and disappointing electoral outcomes of Southern Yemen candidates left the region’s population with a simmering resentment. Thirdly, the armed forces remained largely unintegrated, save for moving some Northern brigades south and some Southern brigades north. This led to periodic skirmishes between the groups, ultimately escalating to a civil war in early 1994.

 Ali Salem al-Bidh, the de facto leader of South Yemen’s old guard, was vice-president to northerner Ali Abdullah Saleh, but this did not stop the former from rebelling against the latter. The secessionists were defeated in short order, with Southern Yemen only independent from May to July.[[480]](#footnote-480) Because of the war’s brevity and the lack of consensus support for independence, even among Southerners, there was little opportunity for al-Bidh to establish governance during the conflict. The southern secessionists had barely time to organize itself politically before being forced into exile.[[481]](#footnote-481)

**Yemen (South) (1986)**

Rebels / Incumbents: Fmr. President Abd al-Fattah Ismail and his supporters / President Ali Nasir Muhammed and his supporters

**Policing/juridical: 0; Public Goods: 0; Consultative instruments: 0**

 South Yemen faced something of a war of succession in early 1986. President Ali Nasir Muhammed, reacting to rising opposition from the country’s politburo—and the resurgent former president Abd al-Fattah Ismail (at the behest of his supporters in Moscow)—sent his bodyguards to sit in for him at a politburo meeting.[[482]](#footnote-482) The bodyguards opened fire on the assembled members, sparking a brief but remarkably violent civil war. The war itself hinged on the allegiances of various elements of Yemen’s armed forces, with the Ismail-aligned tank corps ultimately deciding the conflict.[[483]](#footnote-483)

 There is no evidence that any constructive political developments took place during the conflict. Accounts from the time describe unorganized spasms of violence.[[484]](#footnote-484) Although it is noteworthy that Ali Nasir’s decision to reach out to North Yemen may have contributed to the country’s eventual unification, this eventuality may have also been produced by the loss of much of its political leadership. Ali Nasir was forced to flee the country, as was Ismail.[[485]](#footnote-485) The latter perished under somewhat suspicious circumstances, but even though the former survived, South Yemen’s political class was crippled by the war.

1. Although many sources note the ideological differences along the axes of religion and perceived degree of fundamentalist devotion thereto, Fotini Christia lists them according to their principal ethnic groups. (Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation and Civil Wars*, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 57-60 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Amalendu Misra, *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence*, Polity Press, 2004, pp. 20-26 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid. pp. 48-60 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Antonio Giustozzi, “Afghanistan: Political Parties or Militia Fronts?” *From Soldiers to Politicians: Transforming Rebel Movements After Civil War*, ed. Jeroen De Zeeuw, Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp. 179-181 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Angelo Rasanayagam. 2005. *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co), 134. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Barnett R. Rubin. 2002. *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 236-237. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Rasanayagam. *Afghanistan*, 134-135. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Reyko Huang also notes the mention of legal services (see: 2016. Rebel Governance Dataset Coding Notes, (accessed February 25, 2018), http://www.reykohuang.com/uploads/7/7/5/9/77594542/rgd.zip) but codes legal services as absent as evidence of its application is also such. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 184-201 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Christia, *Alliance Formation*, pp. 61-63 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Misra, *Afghanistan*, pp. 69-79 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Neal A. Englehart, “A Tale of Two Afghanistans: Comparative Governance and Insurgency in the North and South,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July/Aug. 2010), pp. 738-741 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Giustozzi, “Afghanistan,” pp. 180-181 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Christia, *Alliance Formation*, pp. 75-83 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan: A New History*, Routledge Curzon, 2001, pp. 208-211 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Englehart, “Tale of Two Afghanistans,” pp. 741-743 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 2nd Edition*, Yale University Press, 2010, pp. 56-57 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid. pp. 743-746 [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Adam Tarock, “The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran and Afghanistan Conflict,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Aug. 1999), p. 815 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Martin Evans and John Philipps, *Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed*, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. 177-214 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Jeremy, M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 315-318 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid. 215-251 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Armed Islamist Movements and Political Violence in Algeria,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn, 2000), pp. 572-591 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Lahouari Addi, “Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 77, No. 4 (Jul. – Aug. 1998), pp. 44-53 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Nora Dudwick, “Armenia: Paradise Lost?” *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, eds. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 491-492 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Anne-Marie Gardner, “Beyond Standards, before Status: Democratic Governance and non-State Actors,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (July, 2008), pp. 547-548 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, “Living With Non-Recognition: State- and Nation-Building in South Caucasian Quasi-States,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (May, 2008), p. 501 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Bartosz H. Stanislawski, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Krzysztof Strachota, Maciej Falkowski, David M. Crane and Melvyn Levitsky, “Para-States, Quasi-States, and Black Spots: Perhaps Not States, but Not ‘Ungoverned

Territories,’ Either,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June, 2008), pp. 369-374 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Thomas De Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*, New York University Press, 2003, p. 162 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
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